Forgetting

Furthermore, knowing and forgetting are ontic, or a posteriori, 'derivatives' in the sense that they result from the ontological, or a priori, structure of Dasein's being-in-the-world, which is most fundamentally defined by care/concern/Dasein's "dwelling-with." More specifically, forgetting is also "nothing but a particular modification of [Dasein's] being-involved-with" (164). For Heidegger, we are always already in-the-world and involved with it in a particular manner; we are never external to it and do not live our lives theorizing-from-the-outside about the world in the way Husserl suggests. Thus, even though it may at first seem as though forgetting is counter to knowing (i.e., since forgetting most generally signifies something that we once knew, but no longer know), knowing and forgetting are actually similar in that they are both simply modes of our being-in-the-world. If we were not already in the world, not only could we not know things, but we could also not forget them; we have to be involved in the world in order to be able to have these modes of being. Furthermore, knowing and forgetting are ontic, or a posteriori, 'derivatives' in the sense that they result from the ontological, or a priori, structure of Dasein's being-in-the-world, which is most fundamentally defined by care/concern/Dasein's "dwelling-with." More specifically, forgetting is nothing more than a possibility for comportment; it is an example of how Dasein can be in the world. Putting this together with Heidegger’s notion of Seinsvergessenheit (the forgetting of Being), we can say that it is always on ontic possibility that Dasein lose its way with regard to the question of Being, as Heidegger claims Western metaphysics has done since the time of the Greeks. Heidegger’s work is nothing other than a mourning for this forgetting, an attempt to wrest the question of Being from its forgetting in the onto-theological tradition.

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