THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEIDEGGER

I should note at this point that although Brentano clearly influenced Husserl, it is quite likely that Frege was not instrumental in the actual development of either Husserl's general theory of consciousness or his more specific account of linguistic experience. See J. Mohanty, "Husserl and Frege: A New Look at Their Relationship," Research in Phenomenology, 4 (1974): 51-62. The reason for understanding Husserl's theory in terms of Frege's model is that Husserl explicitly acknowledges the parallel with his own theory, and it moves the point of possible confusion back one important step. There may still be very serious problems involved in making the Fregean distinctions across the entire range of conscious experience, but thinking in terms of Frege's model at least makes clear the kinds of distinctions Husserl is trying to make.

For an extended defense of this Heideggerian claim, see H. L. Dreyfus and S. Dreyfus, Mind over Machine. (New York: Macmillan, 1986).

5 Time and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger

One common view of the history of twentieth-century Continental philosophy is as follows. At the beginning of the century Edmund Husserl, disturbed by what he saw as the increasing relativism and historicism of Western culture, introduced the phenomenological method as a way to ensure that philosophy would arrive at final, incontrovertible truths. Phenomenology means primarily description—description of the things presented in our experience and description of our experience of them. The phenomenological movement was heralded by Husserl's cry, "Back to the things themselves!" Because phenomenology "brackets," or suspends belief in, all metaphysical constructs in order to focus solely on what shows up as it presents itself in our experience, its findings are supposed to be apodictic, beyond all possible doubt.

According to the standard story, the early Heidegger came along and raised questions about the viability of Husserlian phenomenology by taking an "interpretive" turn. What is most important about Heidegger's hermeneutic ontology, so the story goes, is his recognition of the significance of the finitude, worldliness, and historicity of our human predicament—the recognition that our access to things is always colored and preshaped by the sense of things circulating in our historical culture. The story then concludes with poststructuralists and various postmodern thinkers detecting a nostalgia for metaphysics even in such Heideggerian concepts as worldliness, finitude, and history. Jacques Derrida especially points out that Heidegger still seems to be trapped in essentialism and totalization, twin sins of the very "metaphysics of presence" that his hermeneutic approach was supposed to displace.

Critical to this story is the assumption that Heidegger's ontologi-
cultural hermeneutics succeeded in undercutting Husserl’s phenomenology. Yet a closer look at Heidegger’s early work suggests that the real story is not so simple. Thinkers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, who build on Heideggerian hermeneutics, make it clear that their own thought presupposes phenomenology. And Heidegger himself, who is supposed to have broken with Husserl, bases his hermeneutics on an account of time that not only parallels Husserl’s account in many ways but seems to have been arrived at through the same phenomenological method as was used by Husserl. So important is the phenomenological account of time to recent Continental philosophy that even Derrida’s well-known critique of the metaphysics of presence was initially formulated through a reflection on the Husserlian account of temporality. The phenomenology of time, then, can serve as a key for understanding not only the relation of Husserl and Heidegger, but the development of Continental thought throughout this century as well. The differences between Husserl and Heidegger are significant, but if we do not see how much it is the case that Husserlian phenomenology provides the framework for Heidegger’s approach, we will not be able to appreciate the exact nature of Heidegger’s project in *Being and Time* or why he left it unfinished.

In this essay I will focus on Heidegger’s early phenomenological account of time and its roots in the work of Husserl. It was Husserl himself who first undertook the project of phenomenological ontology — that is, the attempt to clarify the being of entities in general — and, as we shall see, he saw the phenomenological account of time as central to this project. Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, with its explicit task of relating being to time, follows in the footsteps of Husserl’s project. By showing the relation of Heidegger’s thought to Husserl’s, and by showing the similarities of both to the transcendental philosophy of Kant, I hope to show why time has such a central role in Continental thought. But it will also become clear that serious problems arise for the accounts of time in both Husserl and Heidegger. These problems can help us understand why *Being and Time* was never completed. But they also point to deep questions about the possibility of phenomenology generally, and they can clarify the motivation for some of the recent moves made by poststructuralists, postmodernists, and (to use Richard Rorty’s self-descriptive oxymoron) postphilosophical philosophers.

Let us look first briefly at Husserl’s project. Husserl hoped to provide a formal ontology linked with material ontologies of the various regions, or sorts, of entities. Ontology, as we have already noted, is the account of being in general and concerns essences and fundamental categories. A “formal” ontology treats the basic “forms” or structures of being in general, while a “material” ontology considers how these more general forms are filled out “materially,” so to speak, in the various main types of entities. Husserl uses the geographic metaphor of “region” for these main divisions of entities — hence, the expression “regional” ontology, which is interchangeable with “material” ontology. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929) Husserl writes that the task of formal ontology is to “state what holds good for any objects whatever, any object-provinces whatever, with formal universality, in what forms they exist or merely can exist.” What the phenomenologist asserts in formal ontology must be true of any entity whatever. Sometimes Husserl speaks of formal ontology as treating the basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) or categories of objectivity as such. He thinks of being as objectivity. The notion of “object” and “objectivity” is a broad one, for “object” means more than the objects of perception. There are higher objectivities for Husserl such as those established in mathematics or the social sciences.

Husserl also refers to his project of phenomenological ontology as transcendental. We have just noted that phenomenology describes “objects” (in a broad sense). In order to justify these descriptions and in order to understand ourselves as describers, phenomenological description requires, in addition to careful and methodical description, a consideration of what description is and how it is made possible — that is, phenomenology considers the condition of the possibility not only of objects but of the description of objects. Thus, Husserlian phenomenology is “transcendental” in much the same sense as this term is defined in Immanuel Kant’s introduction to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the work that inaugurates the tradition of transcendental philosophy: “I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori.” By *a priori* is meant knowledge gained of objects, as well as of the knower or subject, by way of rigorous philosophical
reflection and not through the empirical sciences or generalization from everyday experience. \textit{A priori} literally means "prior to experience." Such knowledge is said by Kant to be "necessary," while Husserl calls it "essential." According to the above citation, transcendental philosophy is particularly concerned with the self or subject who carries on this rigorous reflection. Kant was so much concerned with the subjective conditions of objective knowledge that he came to assert that we can never know things as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us conditioned as we are by certain subjective cognitive structures. Here we find the most important disagreement of Husserl with Kant, for Husserl thinks we can know things as they are in themselves. How Husserl squares this commitment with his own version of "transcendental idealism" is something we cannot consider here. Many of his closest students did not think he could; others defended his attempt. In any case, it is important to note that not only objectivity, but also subjectivity must come under scrutiny for a fully justified philosophy. The bare rational self or ego considered only in terms of its basic cognitive structures (or forms) is called the "transcendental ego" by both Kant and Husserl.

Further comparison with Kant's \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} might be helpful here. Formal ontology corresponds to what Kant attempted to accomplish in the Transcendental Analytic, that is, the \textit{a priori} knowledge of an "object in general." For Husserl and Kant, the key to the discovery of the basic forms of objectivity is formal logic. Kant in the metaphysical deduction held that any formal logical law can be converted into an equivalent formal ontological law. Like Kant in the \textit{Critique}, Husserl in \textit{Formal and Transcendental Logic} begins with formal logic and moves on to "transcendental logic," which is formal ontology, though Husserl wants to avoid what he thinks is Kant's naive acceptance of traditional logic as a ground from which to derive the forms of objectivity. Formal logic for Husserl serves rather as a starting point and clue for the development of a formal ontology. For Kant, the regional or material ontology based on the "formal ontology" of the \textit{Critique} would be the metaphysics of nature. According to Husserl's \textit{Ideas II} and \textit{Ideas III}, the task is somewhat more variegated since there are three primary regions: material nature, animate nature, and souls (or persons), and accordingly three regional ontologies: physics, somatology, and psychology.
time and Heidegger's debt, as a phenomenologist, to this account. In
the introduction to the first English translation of these lectures
(1964), Calvin Schrag comments that the materials of the volume
were "compiled and published" by Heidegger. Though Heidegger
did edit and publish them, it has become clear that he did not "com-
pile" them. Husserl's assistant, Edith Stein, had compiled the manu-
script, and Heidegger did relatively little but pass it on to the pub-
lisher. After 1928 the only further publication of Husserl's work on
time was the republication of that edition together with extensive
addenda that doubled the size of the volume. But from approxi-
mately 1917 on Husserl returned in his writing again and again to
time as his central and most basic theme. In the early twenties,
Stein compiled another manuscript dedicated to the theme of time,
and Husserl touted it at one point as his most important work. He
attempted unsuccessfully to get first Roman Ingarden and then
Eugen Fink to publish it. This manuscript, usually referred to as
the "Bernauer" or "L" manuscripts, remains unpublished, as does a
later collection of manuscripts on the phenomenology of time from
the late twenties and early thirties called the "C" manuscripts.

The phenomenology of time requires, of course, that we ignore
our ordinary or scientific assumptions about time and attend rigor-
ously to the lived experience of time. We must bracket "objective"
time, as Husserl calls it in those lectures, to see how time is consti-
tuted immanently in experience—hence the title "inner time con-
sciousness." On this account, we experience time primarily as the
present "now." Yet it is important to see how fundamentally signifi-
cant for Husserl is the rejection of the "objective" view of time as a
punctilinear row of "nows" that stretch both back and forward to
infinity and constitute a one-dimensional line, the objective time
line. In contrast with this one-dimensional view of time, Husserl
offers us a three-dimensional view. The present, for him, is not the
nondimensional point of the instantaneous now. Rather, we might
say that the present is "thick" to the extent that, within the present,
we find both the past and the future; that is, we find all three dimen-
sions of time. Any present moment, according to Husserl, has what
he calls "retentive" and "protentive" aspects. In other words, any
moment is what it is in virtue of what it retains of the past (reten-
tion) and what it anticipates of the future (protention). Every present
moment carries these two aspects as essential to its being what it is
as present. Crudely expressed, they are part of the present. The past
is retained as past in the present, and the future is anticipated as
future in the present. Husserl says that these three dimensions con-
stitute the present. As time passes, each present (this "thick" pres-
ent with three dimensions internal to it) is retained in the succeed-
ing moment—retentionally. This retention and anticipation is, in
our everyday experience, unconscious, but philosophical reflection
shows it to be constitutive of the structure of any moment. Husserl
distinguishes retention from memory, for in memory the past mo-
moment is experienced simply as past and not as part of the present.
In similar fashion, he distinguishes protention from hopes and expecta-
tions, the conscious focusing on some imagined future event as fu-
ture and not as a constitutive aspect of the present. There is a certain
symmetry in the constitution of the lived experience of time, both
protention and retention are essential to the account and both are
distinguished, respectively, from memory and hope. Yet there is at
least one other important element of Husserl's account: the flow of
time is directional. Time flows ineluctably toward the future; it is
not reversible. This understanding of the present as constituted by
retention and protention is the core of Husserl's contribution toward
a philosophy of time.

The centrality of "the present" for this analysis has led to Der-
riba's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology as a "metaphysics of
presence." The primary point of this critique is that the Husserlian
account suppresses absence. Rudolf Bernet, who has developed Der-
riba's critique, writes, for example, that absence cannot so easily be
disposed of and that it returns to haunt Husserl—in his words, "the
repressed element returns." I would suggest on the contrary that
absence is not ignored in Husserl's account, but is considered an
essential element of the present. Retention and protention are
modes of the presence of the absent (the past and the future) as well
as the absence of the present (the past as no longer present and the
future as not yet present). Husserl's thickening of the moment is just
the attempt, I would argue, to render the temporal character of hu-
man experience as the ineluctable interplay of presence and absence.

When, in his Ideas I of 1913, Husserl comes to reflect on the
phenomenological approach of the time lectures and of his earlier
ground-breaking work, Logical Investigations (1900–1), he defends
his method in the problematic terms of "transcendental idealism."
Here as before, Husserl distinguishes phenomenological time and objective (or cosmic) time. Phenomenological time, he writes, is "the unitary form of all lived experience [Erlebnisse] within one stream of lived experience [Erlebnisstrom], i.e., within one pure Ego." Phenomenological or subjective inner time is given methodologically precedence over "cosmic" or "objective" time, which is said to be constituted in inner time.

Husserl's form of idealism follows from the methodological precedence of subjectivity. In the words of Formal and Transcendental Logic, "The whole of phenomenology is nothing more than the self-examination on the part of transcendental subjectivity." Only transcendental subjectivity, Husserl claims in the concluding sections of this book, exists "in and for itself." And so he writes that "the ultimate grounding of all truth is a branch of the universal self-examination that, when carried through radically, is absolute. In other words, it is a self-examination ... which leads me to the grasping of my absolute self, my transcendental ego." This egological self-interpretation of phenomenology Husserl calls the Cartesian way into phenomenology.

When we turn to the question of time, we find that instead of time being just another object constituted in the thematic field of transcendental subjectivity, subjectivity is itself radically temporal. Frequently Husserl simply identifies time with subjectivity (much as Kant sometimes identifies "inner sense" with the subject). At other times it seems as though Husserl is arguing that the ego, as absolute, is not itself temporal but is the source of temporality. He speaks of the ego as the origin (Ursprung) and the source (Quelle) of time. As the Quelle, which also means "spring," the ego is the spring of the stream of time. The spring itself does not flow but is constantly in the same place. Thus, in these same manuscripts Husserl often refers to the ego, which is this source or spring, as the nunc stans, or "standing now," a phrase that goes back to medieval scholasticism. It is the now that originates the flow of time but is not itself in time – hence its "standing" character. The standing now is the ego's primal form of being. As "standing," it constitutes the flow of time.

We have just noted how one approach of Husserl is to say that subjectivity (or the ego) is radically temporal. Taken this way, it is just the flow of time. A second approach sees the ego as somehow outside of time constituting time. But as Husserl develops his treatment of time in the late C manuscripts, he comes to think of time in relation to the subject in a third way – that is, neither [1] as subjective, nor [2] as originating in atemporal subjectivity, but [3] as somehow prior to the distinction between subject and object. In this third way time itself comes to be understood as that primordial source [Ursprung] out of which the ego and object poles emerge. The ground of the ego is time; time itself is "radically pre-egological." It is "a temporalizing-temporal primal occurring [Urgeschehen] which does not spring from egological sources [aus Quellen des Ichs]; it therefore occurs without participation of the ego." Again and again Husserl here takes up the notion of the "standing and perduring primal now," which itself is not in time but temporalizes – which is to say that it is the source of time. What is flowing and ephemeral is grounded in what is permanent. The permanent standing now is the absolute, which has its own ground in itself and is not grounded in anything else. It is, he writes, without ground (grundlos); as constituting, it is not itself constituted. We could say of time, seen in this way, what Heidegger later comes to say: "Temporality temporalizes."[BT 377]

Thus we can see that when Husserl develops his treatment of time, he is ambivalent about the relation of transcendental subjectivity and temporality. Are subjectivity and temporality identical? Or is temporality prior to subjectivity and its objective correlate, that is, is it a pre-egological source out of which subjects and objects are constituted in time? If it is, then it is no longer appropriate to characterize the most important level of phenomenological analysis as egology. The egological project breaks down. The paradox of subjectivity (being both a subject for the world and an object in the world) becomes the paradox of time (being both a nontemporal source of the world and a temporal objective characteristic of the world). Further, we are led to ask whether phenomenology can resolve these questions. Is Husserl still maintaining a phenomenological standpoint when he discusses the primal ego as a monad or when he develops the concept of the standing now? That is, is this still a description of what is immanent in consciousness? Another way to see this difficulty is to recall the title of the early lectures on time: "Inner Time Consciousness." Time on the later account just discussed is neither "inner" nor a function of "consciousness." These two closely related sorts of questions – the ontological and the
methodological – are two aspects of what might be called Husserl's deep problem with time. There is a second important complex of ontological problems with respect to time that we should note here, if only briefly. It concerns not the deep question of the nature of time itself, but the "higher-level" question of the temporal constitution of different sorts of entities. As we have seen, Husserl is committed to the thesis that human experience is radically temporal. All aspects of experience have a temporal genesis – hence the importance of genetic (as opposed to static) phenomenology. But what are the relations between (1) time as such, (2) natural time (which Husserl sometimes calls "space-time" [Raum-Zeit]), and (3) historical time? Husserl never treats this question extensively, though he does distinguish natural and historical time as different modes of time. Sometimes Husserl seems to be working toward a treatment of natural and historical time that would render them equally fundamental, each with its own basis in the temporality of transcendental subjectivity. More often he seems to be working toward the view that historical time is founded on natural time. That which mediates the two is human bodiliness. We historical beings are also natural and bodily beings.

To sum up, we have seen how the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl was confounded by the problem of time in at least two ways. The deeper ontological problem of time concerns the relation of temporality and subjectivity, and it leads us to the limits of an egological phenomenology. The higher-level difficulty concerns the relation of natural time and historical time to each other, and to time as such. We can find parallel problems concerning time in Heidegger's ontology, problems both methodological and substantive.

### THE EARLY HEIDEGGER AND TIME

Some of the disagreements between Husserl and his protégé Heidegger result from a fundamental misunderstanding on the side of Husserl as to the nature of Heidegger's project. Husserl had established a phenomenological research program in the early twenties in Freiburg. Based on his method, this research program was to be a cooperative one. Husserl, as founder of the method, understood his own task as doing the ground-breaking work in formal ontology and methodology. He hoped his followers and students would develop the regional ontologies. His journal, the *Yearbook of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, would publish the results of their research. He hoped that Heidegger, whom he considered his most able follower, would provide the regional ontology for history and the historical sciences. Sometimes Heidegger himself presented his own project in this way, but in fact what Heidegger chose to do instead was to pursue the ontology of time itself (what I have called the deeper ontological question) rather than the regional ontology of the historical realm. From Husserl's perspective, however, Heidegger asserts of time itself and being as such what might well be appropriate of the historical region. For Husserl, such a move historicizes being in such a way that we are left only with anthropology, historicism, and relativism. It seems that he understands Heidegger this way because Heidegger's starting point is *Dasein*, defined as being-in-the-world, a being-in-the-world that is thoroughly historical.

Whatever Husserl's assessment of Heidegger's attempt, a careful look at Heidegger's early project shows that he gets caught up in methodological and ontological problems similar to those of Husserl. Heidegger never completed this project and later abandoned it. We can find it developed in *Being and Time* (1927) and in the early published works that immediately follow it: *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1928) and *On the Essence of Reasons* (1928), as well as in the recently published lectures delivered when he was at Marburg from 1922 to 1928. Though we cannot here examine the problems and the parallels in detail, we can provide a short sketch.

*Heidegger's early project: ontological, phenomenological, transcendental, and hermeneutic*

The question for *Being and Time* is the question of being. In the Introduction, Heidegger tells us that he seeks to clarify the meaning of being [BT 31]. This is his question, he tells us further, because it is the most basic question. All other questions presuppose that there is being, and all the sciences make assumptions about being. Since the work is about being and not about this or that sort of being or entity, his task is, in the first place, ontology. He calls the work "fundamental ontology" because it is concerned with the most basic question and because ontologies of the various sorts of entities necessarily presuppose it:
The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences, which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and, in so doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. (BT 31)

We find here a clear parallel with Husserl's project. Fundamental ontology concerns the meaning of being as such. It establishes the basis for the ontologies of various regions of being, which, in turn, provide the philosophical basis for the sciences, clarifying the assumptions and basic concepts of the sciences. By "ontical" in the passage just quoted Heidegger means that which is concerned primarily with entities and not with being as such. The regions that Heidegger has in mind are those of history and nature. The regional ontology of each would provide the appropriate philosophical basis, respectively, for the human sciences and for the natural sciences. It is not clear whether Heidegger ever intended for himself to develop the regional ontologies, but it is clear that it is in relation to possible regional ontologies that Heidegger conceived of his task in Being and Time as fundamental ontology.

Being and Time is also a work in transcendental phenomenology in much the same sense as the philosophy of Husserl. Phenomenology, Heidegger writes in the Introduction, "signifies primarily a methodological conception. This expression does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research" (BT 50). It is a descriptive method that allows things to show themselves for what they are. To call it "transcendental" is to adopt terminology from Kant and Husserl, which means, as we saw earlier, "a priori" or necessary knowledge. As the preceding quotation states, fundamental ontology hopes to establish the a priori or necessary conditions for the regional ontologies and the sciences. In other words, fundamental ontology would develop the background required for the regional ontologies to proceed. It should establish the basic concepts and assumptions of these fields by making clear the basic or "formal" structures of being. Heidegger expresses his debt to Husserl in a footnote about the a priori, in which he writes that "Husserl has given us the necessary tools" (i.e., a method) for discovering the a priori. Here Heidegger asserts, "A-priorism is the method of every scientific philosophy which understands itself" (BT 490).

Heidegger's phenomenological method is also transcendental in the further related sense discussed earlier that such a method is as much concerned with the structures of subjectivity as it is with the structure of objectivity. In the Introduction Heidegger, self-consciously using Kantian language, criticizes Kant for not adequately treating the "subjectivity of the subject" (BT 45). Heidegger sets out to deal with this aspect in a better way than his predecessors Kant and Husserl. Important to Heidegger's improved approach is to drop the language of subject and subjectivity, object and objectivity. When Heidegger uses these terms, they are almost always in quotation marks to indicate that he is referring to the way things have been discussed in the philosophical tradition. One of the chief reasons Heidegger is so keen on avoiding this language is that to start with this duality of subject and object seems inevitably to lead to an unbridgeable gap between them, so that the logical outcome is subjectivism in some form or other. One prominent form of subjectivism related to the question of knowledge is representationalism, the view that the subject makes the world available to itself by means of representations. Since these representations are inevitably of its own making, there is no way of knowing in the end whether the representations mirror nature truthfully or are "merely" useful fictions. Kant's denial of any knowledge of the way things are in themselves is a good example of one such view. For Kant, neither the transcendental ego nor things in themselves are in time. Rather, time is a function of our subjective capacity to represent things to ourselves, so that the things we experience are shaped by our activity of representing. Though Heidegger did not regard Husserl's phenomenology as a form of representationalism, he still think that Husserl's language, particularly the language of subjectivity and objectivity, often betrayed Husserl's best insights.

So Heidegger sets the stage for his own attempt to clarify the meaning of being by giving an account of what he calls Dasein, the "there" (Da) where being (Sein) shows itself. Before directly addressing the central theme, being, we are to consider first where it is that being shows itself. And this means examining ourselves, since being is "an issue" for us in a way that it is not for other entities. To consider this is to consider the conditions that hold for there to be
meaning. *Being and Time* sets for itself the task of establishing the meaning of being, and it addresses the question of meaning before it directly addresses being. Much like Kantian transcendental philosophy, Heidegger's fundamental ontology asks about the conditions of the possibility of knowing the subject matter of the inquiry before it takes up the subject matter, though Heidegger focuses on “understanding” instead of “knowing” with its implied relation of a subject to an object.

It is important to note that Heidegger's study of Dasein is a study of us *insofar as* we can come to terms with being. Heidegger's study or phenomenological account is about Dasein, being-there, and not about human being or human nature. Thus, it is not an attempt to give a full account of what it means to be human. According to Heidegger, his account in *Being and Time* should provide the appropriate basis or background for such an account, but this work is intended to be fundamental ontology, not philosophical anthropology.

The most important single fact about *Being and Time* is that it is unfinished. This work, as envisaged at the end of its introduction (BT 63-4), was to have two parts, each with three sections. The published text provides only the first two sections of Part I, which means that only the preparatory treatment of Dasein is accomplished. The third section, which is entitled “Time and Being” and which was to elucidate directly the concept of being, was never satisfactorily completed. In the end we have only the account of Dasein.

**Time and the analysis of Dasein**

Let us look at what is accomplished in the published text, that is, the analysis of Dasein, and notice the centrality of the theme of time. In the Introduction Heidegger declares that in contrast to all this [the history of philosophy], our treatment of the question of the meaning of Being must enable us to show that the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, if rightly seen and rightly explained, and we must show how this is the case. (BT 40)

Heidegger shows “how” time is central through the description, or “Interpretation,” of Dasein. Because we are temporal beings, our ability to encounter things as such and such is also temporal. Dasein is thoroughly temporal, and thus Dasein’s understanding is temporal. And so must be our understanding of being. Thus, to cite the Introduction once again, “the Interpretation of Dasein” is to be accomplished “in terms of temporality [Zeitlichkeit]” (BT 63). In this way time comes to serve “as the transcendental horizon [or context] for the question of Being” (BT 63). Accordingly, it is clear that the phenomenology of time is at the heart of Heidegger’s ontological project.

The first half of the text (“Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein”) provides what could be called a “static” structural or “formal” account of Dasein. The second half (“Dasein and Temporality”) then shows how these structures must be understood as temporal structures. Heidegger himself calls the analysis formal but explicitly rejects calling it categorial. Categories, as we will see later, pertain to nature but not to Dasein. Heidegger names the formal structures and defining concepts of Dasein “existentialia.” Dasein, as already noted, is defined as being-in-the-world. The hyphens, almost as awkward in German as they are in English, are indicative of the fact that, as Dasein, self and world are a unity. The world is not something external but is constitutive of Dasein. We are born into a world whose history and culture help make us who we are. The Christian view that “we are in the world, but not of the world” is transformed. We are both in and of the world. “Worldliness” is an ontological property of Dasein; it is our context of involvements.

The preparatory analysis of Dasein is concerned primarily with an explication of what it means to be in the world, of how we find ourselves in relation to things in the world in “average every­dayness.” This “being in relation” is our worldliness. Being-in is seen to have two principal structures: understanding and state of mind. We understand ourselves and our world in terms of our practical involvements and projects. In understanding, we are ahead of ourselves, writes Heidegger. State of mind is the way we find ourselves already disposed toward things in this way or that. (“Disposition” might be a better translation for *Befindlichkeit* than is “state of mind.”) The analysis concludes with an attempt to show how both of these are aspects of care (*Sorge*), which best captures not just one aspect of Dasein but Dasein in its entirety. Heidegger defines care as “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-[the world]-as Being­alongside-[entities encountered within the world]” (BT 237). This is
a tripartite definition which says that Dasein has the following structures: (1) ahead of itself (understanding), (2) already in (disposition), and (3) alongside. Heidegger often refers to these three structures as existentiality, facticity, and fallenness.

For our purposes here it is most important to note that these three aspects of Dasein are given a temporal interpretation in the second half of Being and Time: “The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality” (BT 375). The three aspects of care correspond to the three dimensions of time: the future (ahead of itself), the past (facticity), and the present (fallenness). The unity of Dasein is founded on care, whose unity in turn is founded on temporality. Any moment of human experience has these three dimensions. Heidegger talks about this three-dimensionality of the lived experience of time as the “ecstatic” unity of time. By this he means how each of these three dimensions is distinctive and distinguishable from the other two, that is, how each dimension “stands out” from the others. “Standing out” is the literal meaning of “ecstasy.” By the ecstatic character of time Heidegger also means to describe how any moment is a crossing point of past and future. The present bears within it the past and the future. Past and future make it up. This connectedness and ecstatic unity he sometimes refers to as the “transcendence” of time and the transcendence of Dasein, which is essentially temporal in just this way. The present moment goes beyond, or “transcends,” the merely present in the way that it, as present, is at the same time future and past. In this way Heidegger recovers and maintains in the context of his own work the Husserlian insight about what I have called the thick unity of time. He follows Husserl as well in criticizing the view of time that thinks of it as an infinite series of points, of nows—what Heidegger calls “now-time” (Jetzzeit; see BT §81).

What most obviously distinguishes Heidegger’s account from Husserl’s is the way, on Heidegger’s account, Dasein can live out its temporality as authentic or inauthentic. Thus, there are authentic and inauthentic modes of understanding and disposition. For the most part, according to Heidegger, Dasein is inauthentic and fallen, caught up and lost in the present in a way that cuts it off from its authentic future (its “ownmost possibility”) and its past. What the future holds for any and every Dasein is death. Another definition of Dasein is therefore provided: being-toward-death. In the authentic moment, we recognize and accept our mortality. Heidegger’s story of Dasein is, in this regard, not so unlike the Christian story of fallen human nature (though Heidegger denies that his story is just another version of original sin). While the present has priority for the inauthentic, the future has priority for the authentic life. Notice that this gives priority to understanding over disposition, since Heidegger connects the understanding with the future and disposition with the past.

**Time and the meaning of being**

Being and Time, as we have already noted, never gets so far as to address directly the meaning of being, but instead concludes with the question: “Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being?” (BT 488). Approximately a year after his completion of the text of Being and Time, in the lectures of the summer semester of 1927, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger explicitly sets for himself the task of finding this way from time to the meaning of being and so of completing Part I of Being and Time with a full-fledged ontology. Yet the reader (and the student in the lecture hall) is disappointed, because the lectures break off just before the designated treatment. We can find in these lectures, nonetheless, indications of the approach Heidegger was taking and the problems he faced. As required, he approaches the question of being through time. The shift from the analysis of the temporality of Dasein to the temporality of being is marked terminologically by the shift from the standard German Zeitlichkeit (temporality) to the Latinate Temporalität (temporality). The temporality of Dasein is Zeitlichkeit; the temporality of Being is Temporalität. A question the text does not answer concerns what the consequences of this shift might be. Is the analysis of the temporality of being merely an extension of the account of time in Being and Time, or are there important differences in the two accounts? Heidegger’s comment in the Letter on Humanism makes us wonder about the shift when he says of the third section of Part I, “Time and Being”: “Here everything is reversed” (BW 208). This comment, however, comes after the great turn in Heidegger’s thought and his abandonment of the project of fundamental ontology. There is no talk of “reversal” in Basic Problems.
What we do find Heidegger doing in Basic Problems is giving an account of being in terms of its regions that is consistent with the stated project of developing a fundamental and regional ontology. The regions are divided according to their type of temporality. There are two main regions, each with two subdivisions: (1) that within time (das Innerzeitige; subdivisions: nature and history) and (2) the atemporal (das Unzeitige; subdivisions: extratemporal and supratemporal). We might be inclined to object to these divisions of being and the notion of the atemporal, since Heidegger has rejected eternal truths and asserted that we are to understand being only through temporality. Yet the discussion here in Basic Problems does not deny the temporality of all understanding. It insists, rather, that the atemporal can be understood only in terms of temporality. Being and time are not simply equivalent, though the understood meaning of being must, in some way, be temporal.

Working out these divisions while at the same time maintaining the unity of being clearly posed serious problems for Heidegger. This is indicated directly in the title of the lecture series, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, and by the introductory outline for the lectures, which indicates that Part II was to be concerned with thematic problems in laying out the basic structures of being, while Part III was to be concerned with the methodological problems of Heidegger's phenomenological approach to the question of being. Heidegger's designation of these problems for his fundamental ontology reminds us of what we have called Husserl's "deep" ontological problems of theme and method. Though we can distinguish the problems this way, that is, as thematic and methodological problems, they are closely related. Their close relationship can best be seen if we ask how the method allows us to make this thematic distinction of regions within being. Does the method take us outside both regions such that from the perspective of being we view these regions and differentiate them? In other words, is the distinction made "externally"? Yet if we are speaking from the perspective of Dasein, are we not making the distinction from "within time"?

In Basic Problems as well as in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, lectures of a year later (the last lectures at Marburg, summer semester, 1928), Heidegger is clearly concerned with the methodology of phenomenology and its specifically scientific character. As scientific, phenomenology according to Heidegger is necessarily neutral and indifferent with respect to its subject matter or themes. In other terms, phenomenological methodology is inevitably objectifying. In the context of his discussion of the regions of being according to time as "in time," "out of time," and "above time," we must wonder about the justification of the distinctions and how it is that these regions become objects of study. This is particularly problematic if we recall Heidegger's oft-stated criticism of objectivism and his treatment of "indifference" in Being and Time as an inauthentic quality of Dasein. Were we simply and straightforwardly to follow Heidegger's suggestion that indifference is inauthentic, it would seem that phenomenology must be inauthentic. This is, of course, absurd in the context of Heidegger's project. We are left to wonder if, in the projected last part of Basic Problems, where Heidegger was to have addressed these questions of methodology at length, he would not have reinterpreted indifference for the philosophical attitude. Perhaps the indifference and neutrality of philosophy are significantly different from the indifference of inauthentic everyday experience. But nowhere in Heidegger's early work is a satisfying account to be found.

The ontological difference between nature and history

Another major problem with the project of Being and Time that becomes quite apparent in Basic Problems concerns the distinction within the temporal region of being, the distinction we have referred to as that between nature and history. Earlier we referred to Husserl's treatment of this distinction as his "higher-level difficulty." Anyone who has attended to Heidegger at all knows how important for his work - early, middle, and late - is the ontological difference (ontologische Differenz), the difference between being and beings. But there is another ontological difference that plays an equally significant but systematically quite different role for the early Heidegger. In German he calls this the ontological Unterschied, as opposed to the ontological Differenz. This less discussed difference, the Unterschied, is the difference, just mentioned, between nature and history. Heidegger charges the philosophical tradition with indifference to this ontological difference (Unterschied) and rests much of his own claim to philosophical originality on just this distinction.

He recognizes, of course, that something like this distinction has
commonly been made in modern philosophy. Kant’s distinction between persons and nature is the most pertinent example because of Kant’s lasting influence in philosophy. Heidegger objects to the way that Kant handles the distinction, because, according to Heidegger, the distinction implicitly collapses inasmuch as persons [historical beings for Heidegger] are treated much like natural entities. Though Kant means to present the person as quite different from natural entities [most importantly different, since persons are free and morally responsible], he does not, according to Heidegger, adequately sustain the distinction. Ultimately the person is treated as a different sort of natural entity. It is worth noting here that Heidegger is almost never critical of the Kantian treatment of nature. In fact, he sometimes affirms it. The mistake he sees being made is the dominance of the treatment of nature over the treatment of persons. Kant’s first *Critique* is a regional ontology of nature for Heidegger, and it is within this frame that persons are presented. Thus, for Heidegger the Kantian account undermines the distinctiveness of Dasein even though it hopes to affirm it. Heidegger would succeed where Kant had failed. The difference [Unterschied] between history and nature, as Heidegger hopes to develop it, is so great that it is, he asserts, far greater than the traditional ontological difference drawn between God and man, between creator and creation. His distinction is so radical that it would obviously disallow the Husserlian understanding of ourselves as natural beings.

Inasmuch as this distinction between two regions of beings is developed and prepared in fundamental ontology, that is, in the treatment of the meaning of being, we could say that with this ontological distinction Heidegger is attempting to drive the Kantian distinction of person and nature [implicit even in Descartes’s *res cogitans—res extensa* distinction] back into the very treatment of being as such. But if the difference between the two is so great, then working out a unitary concept of being will become exceedingly difficult. And Heidegger explicitly set himself the task of working out a unitary concept of being, though he never succeeded in developing it. The “higher-level” problem of the relation of Dasein and nature in terms of temporality is at the same time a “deep” problem in the basic account of the meaning of being as such. We should recall that the immediate context for establishing this unitary concept of being is the account of temporality that Heidegger begins in the *Basic Problems* lectures. Let us look a little more closely at this distinction, which is so important to Heidegger’s project.

First of all, we should note that Heidegger abandons, for the most part, the term “nature,” presumably because both in ordinary and in philosophical usage the term has received interpretations that cover over the distinction Heidegger wants to make. Thus, the distinction that Heidegger draws in the temporal region “within time” is that between Dasein [which we have used here as a technical term and have not translated] and *Vorhandensein* [translated as “presence-at-hand” in *Being and Time* and “being-extant” in *Basic Problems*]. According to Heidegger’s sketchy account of the distinction in *Basic Problems* (for which we can find the ground laid in *Being and Time*), Dasein is a “who,” not a “what.” The formal structures laid out in the phenomenological account of it are “existentialia” [a term coined by Heidegger], and not “categories.” Presence-at-hand [or extantness] is appropriately considered a “what,” and the appropriate philosophical treatment of it is by way of categories. That is, the philosophy of nature was treated appropriately in modern philosophy [and particularly in Kant] by way of categories. Methodologically the accounts of the two regions are parallel [who/what; existentiale/category], but we might ask about their intersection. That is, how is it that Dasein knows or uses the extant? In more traditional terms, we might wonder how it is that we, as persons, find ourselves in a world not only of persons [and history] but of nature as well.

It would be helpful here to look back at the treatment of extantness in Section 15 of *Being and Time* [and again later in §69 b], where Heidegger treats our encounter with things in the world as exemplified by work in a workshop. In the first place, according to the account given there, we experience things practically as equipment (Zeug). The equipment of the workplace is either “handy” [zuhanden, translated as “ready-to-hand” in *Being and Time*] or “not handy.” Only when the tool breaks down or cannot be found do we “theoretically” attend to it as being present in a certain way, that is, as having certain properties, or as not being present at all. Heidegger insists here that “handiness is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially” [BT 101]. With this assertion he also rejects the suggestion that handiness be understood merely as “a way of taking them, . . . a subjective coloring.” Nonetheless, he also says that “yet only by reason of
something present-at-hand [or "extant"] 'is there' anything handy" [BT 101]. He then asks a question he does not answer: "Does it follow that handiness is ontologically founded upon presence-at-hand?" At stake in this question is the question as to which is ontologically prior - our practical approach to things or our theoretical approach.

It is telling that the opening scene of Being and Time is that of the craftsman at his workbench surrounded by his tools, and not a scene in a more "natural" setting. Tools, like the hammer or turn signals of an automobile (Heidegger's examples), are human constructs and defined, as Heidegger points out, by a network of [human] involvements. But when Heidegger turns to another example and another scene, the scene of a farmer in Swabia (where Heidegger was born and grew up) surveying the sky for signs of rain, it seems to be an example of a different kind, since we should ask whether the wind can be understood as equipment in the same way that the hammer can. If it cannot be, it is hard to accept the claim that Heidegger makes here: "Only by the circumspection with which one takes account of things in farming is the south wind discovered in its Being," that is, as the herald of rain and good crops [BT 112].

The workshop and the fields are part of Dasein's world. Dasein is ontologically defined as worldly, as we have already seen; it is being-in-the-world. On the other hand, nature, or extantness, Heidegger tells us, does not belong ontologically to the world. Worldliness (Weltlichkeit) is not an ontological property of nature. Yet Dasein encounters nature only in the world. Accordingly, Heidegger calls nature (or the extant) as encountered in the world "intraworldly" (innerweltlich, translated as "innerworldly" in Being and Time). Yet to cite Heidegger once again: "Intraworldliness does not belong to nature's Being" [BT 112]. We are left to ask, If nature is encountered only as intraworldly, yet intraworldliness does not belong to nature's being, do we encounter nature as it is in itself? This question is promoted by Heidegger himself when he insists with the example of the south wind in Swabia that only through farming do we discover it "in its Being." With the difference between Dasein and nature as great as it is, how can nature be what it is "in its Being" in Dasein's world?

This great difference between Dasein and nature is most starkly asserted in terms of time in the concluding paragraph of History of the Concept of Time lectures, where Heidegger simply states that "they [the movements of nature] are as such completely time-free." He also says here, consistent with what we have already noted, that nature is "encountered 'in' the time which we ourselves are" [HCT 320]. But we must recall the assignment of nature as a subdivision to the region "within time" in Basic Problems. Nature is "within time" only as encountered in Dasein's world. As encountered, it becomes a part of history and culture. Accordingly, in Being and Time we can find Heidegger saying that "even nature is historical." He quickly adds, however, that "it is not historical, to be sure, in so far as we speak of 'natural history'" [BT 440]. The examples of nature as historical are cultural: the battlefield and the site of a cult. It is in the sense referred to as "natural history" that Heidegger later says in Basic Problems that "culture is not the way that nature is" [BP 169]. We are left to wonder how Heidegger can say in Basic Problems that nature (or the extant), if it is indeed "time-free" and so different from Dasein, can together with Dasein constitute the region of being that is within time.

Their difference is emphasized in still another way in the History of the Concept of Time, where Heidegger utilizes Wilhelm Dilthey's distinction between understanding and explanation in saying that nature is explainable [erklärbart] but not understandable [not verständlich]. Nature is "the incomprehensible [Unverständliche] pure and simple" [HCT 217]. Yet to say that nature is not to be understood runs against the claim that the Swabian farmer knows the south wind "in its Being." We might wonder about the less practical, and more theoretical, knowledge of weather of the natural sciences. Presumably meteorology is derived from the more primal experience of living with the weather. Clearly for Heidegger both the natural sciences and farming are aspects of culture; they have their place in the world and are historical. But nature is not "worldly," as we have just seen. This is made clear when Heidegger asserts that, though there is no world without Dasein, there would be nature without Dasein: "Nature can also be when no Dasein exists" [BP 170]. Nature, then, is not merely a projection of the natural sciences or of our practical involvements with it. But it seems that our understanding of it, such as it is, comes from our practical involvements. This raises the question as to whether nature for Heidegger can be encountered only instrumentally. It also
suggests a parallel with the Kantian view that we cannot know things as they are in themselves, but only insofar as they appear to us.

On this reading of Heidegger’s claims, it is tempting to sever the question of being (ontology) from the question of knowledge (epistemology). Yet the central motive of phenomenology for both Husserl and Heidegger was to overcome this break and to make the claim that in some important sense we can know things in themselves. Heidegger thinks that Husserl’s transcendental idealism does not succeed, and that Husserl falls back into a version of Kant’s idealism. As a result, Heidegger set out to develop a phenomenology that would not give precedence to the subject in the way that Kant and Husserl (in his egological approach) did. Yet he finds himself in a position with important parallels to Husserl and Kant. In one sense, Heidegger’s problem is greater than Husserl’s insofar as the difference between Dasein and nature is so much greater. Whereas Husserl thinks we are natural beings, this does not seem to be the case according to Heidegger.

**CONCLUSION**

Our discussion may seem to have taken us away from the theme of time. Yet we should recall that Heidegger [like Husserl before him] draws the distinction between extantness (or nature) and Dasein within the context of a treatment of the temporality of being. The boundaries of the regions of being are, in the first place, temporal boundaries, and the problems this creates parallel what I have called Husserl’s “higher-level” problem of time. Both Dasein and extantness are “within time,” yet we have just seen some of the problems that Heidegger faces in this regard.

Perhaps the clearest indication of Heidegger’s initial orientation and its problems is his statement in the conclusion of the *History of the Concept of Time* lectures that “Dasein . . . temporalizes” (HCT 319). This is like Husserl’s according time to the function of transcendental subjectivity. Dasein (in the case of Heidegger) or the transcendental ego (in the case of Husserl) originates time. Yet in *Being and Time* Heidegger writes that “temporality [Zeitlichkeit] temporalizes” (BT 377). And, further, he summarizes his position in *Being and Time* with the statement, “Time is primordial as the tempora-
difficult by the great difference between Dasein and extantness. This
difficulty is related to the first insofar as the methodological priority
of Dasein makes it difficult to make sense of the extent as independent
of Dasein, though such independence is ontologically, if not epistemologically, required. It is perhaps these difficulties that led
Heidegger later to write that “the ecstatic-horizonal temporality
delineated in Being and Time is not by any means already the most
proper attribute of time that must be sought in answer to the Being-
question.”39

As a consequence, the planned shift or reversal from Dasein’s
temporality (Zeitlichkeit) to the temporality of being (Temporalität)
cannot be satisfactorily carried out. Another turn is needed—one
that leaves behind the project of a phenomenology that is transcend-
dental, ontological, and hermeneutic. In his later writings Heidegger
abandons the planned defense of the necessary apriorism of “scientific” philosophy. He abandons “philosophy” for “thought.”

Yet it is precisely the central role given to time by Husserl and
Heidegger that has brought about our current insight into the his-
toricity and finitude of all human experience and all philosophical
inquiry. Whether one sees this as ground for further philosophizing,
or, with the later Heidegger, as leading us to a postphilosophical
project of “thinking,” or as a warrant for a new stance of postmodern
“playfulness” and “decentering,” it is clear that the phenomenology
of time, with all its problems, has redefined our understanding of
what philosophy can be.

NOTES

1 Gadamer tells us that one of his goals in Truth and Method [New York:
Seabury Press, 1975] was to measure up to the “conscientiousness of phenomenological description which Husserl has made a duty for us all”
[p. xv]. He also says that “it is true that my book is phenomenological in
its method” [p. xxiv]. Ricoeur explicitly asserts that hermeneutics pre-
supposes phenomenology in his essay “Phenomenology and Hermeneu-
tics” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. and trans. John B.
Moreover, time is a theme central to both Ricoeur and Gadamer. Note
Ricoeur’s recent three-volume work Time and Narrative [Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1988]. I have shown the significance of an
understanding of temporality for Gadamer’s hermeneutics in my essay

“Philosophical Discourse and the Ethics of Hermeneutics,” in Festivals
of Interpretation, ed. Kathleen Wright (Albany: State University of New
2 See Speech and Phenomena, trans. David Allison [Evanston, Ill.: North-
western University Press, 1973].
3 Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion
Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969), p. 120. For the discussion of formal
ontology in Husserl’s earlier work of 1913, Ideas I, see §10, “Region
and Category.” This is available in English translation as Vol. 2 of Edmund
Smith [New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965], p. 59 (B 25 according to the
standard pagination of the second edition of the Critique).
5 Ideas II and Ideas III are available in English translation in Edmund
Husserl: Collected Works, respectively as Vol. 3 [trans. Richard Rojce-
These two volumes were never published by Husserl and were first
published in German in 1952 and 1971 (Husserliana, Vols. IV and V [The
Hague: Nijhoff]). In a footnote in Being and Time Heidegger gratefully
acknowledges his familiarity with these then-unpublished manuscripts
[BT 489].
6 See the end of the chapter on the schematism in the Critique of Pure
7 For Husserl’s treatment of space and spatiality see his lectures from
1907, Ding and Raum, Vol. 16 of his collected works, Husserliana [The
8 See Schrag’s Introduction to The Phenomenology of Internal Time Con-
sciousness, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University
9 Edmund Husserl, Husserliana, Vol. 10: Zur Phänomenologie des in-
neren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917), ed. Rudolf Boehm [The Hague:
Nijhoff, 1966]. This has recently been translated by John Brough (with a
complete retranslation of the 1905 lectures) as Vol. 4 of Edmund
Husserl: Collected Works – On the Phenomenology of the Conscious-
Brough’s helpful introduction concerning the history of the edition.
11 See his “Is the Present Ever Present?” Research in Phenomenology, 12
12 Ideas I, p. 192, translation revised.
14 Ibid., p. 274.
See §13 of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* (1931), trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960): "We are envisaging a science that is absolutely subjective. . . . It begins in pure egology." It should also be noted here, however, that the Cartesian approach is not the only way into phenomenology. The "way in" attempted in the *Crisis of the European Sciences* (1936) is through everyday experience, what Husserl calls the "life-world." Even when adopting the Cartesian mode, Husserl is substantially critical of Descartes.

There are many examples of this in the unpublished C manuscripts. For example, in No. 71, p. 5 of the typed transcription, Husserl writes that "the ego in its most original originality is not in time." And in No. 71 II, pp. 11–13, he discusses the absolute ego as the source or spring (Quelle) of all phenomena. Husserl wrote almost daily in shorthand, returning always to the theme of time. These manuscripts from the late twenties and early thirties are repetitive and sometimes contradictory, since Husserl is carrying out thought experiments trying to find out where different approaches might lead him. For example, Husserl sometimes comes close to identifying this "standing now" with God - Leibniz's God - as a way to consider the higher-level subjectivity that is not temporal but constitutes the temporality of subjectivity. In other contexts, he considers the possibility of an ultimate unconscious behind consciousness - e.g., On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, p. 394.

"Die Zeitlichkeit . . . zeigt sich" (SZ 328). It is important to note that what is the subject and agent here is temporality, not the ego (as it is sometimes for Husserl) or Dasein (as it is for Heidegger in the earlier lectures, *History of the Concept of Time*). In the same context as this quote concerning Zeitlichkeit, Heidegger asserts that "primordial temporality" is prior to Dasein (BT 380–2).

Being and Time first appeared in Vol. 8 (1927) of this yearbook, together with Oskar Becker's phenomenological account of mathematics. Becker was another of Husserl's assistants.


Note the comment about the possibility of working up a philosophical anthropology on the basis of Being and Time (BT 169–70). Philosophical anthropology is to be understood as a regional ontology. See the discussion of this in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* §37. In *History of the Concept of Time*, lectures from 1925 that are an earlier version of Being and Time, Heidegger begins and ends with a discussion of the distinction of nature and history. The subtitle of the published edition of the announced title of the lecture series is "Prolegomena to a Phenomenology of History and Nature."

In *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (lectures of 1928) Heidegger acknowledges the importance of Husserl's account for his own view of time and temporality: "With regard to all previous interpretations, it was Husserl's service to have seen these phenomena [the unity of time and its various aspects] for the first time" (MFL 204).

The attentive reader is rightly puzzled about the modes of Dasein in Being and Time. Usually Heidegger writes as though there are two modes of Dasein, authentic and inauthentic, but sometimes he suggests that there are three. The third is neither authentic nor inauthentic but indifferent. I discuss this puzzle in "The Problem of Indifferenz in Sein und Zeit," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 43 (September 1982): 43–58. I show how Heidegger's ambivalence between two or three modes is related to the methodological problems of the phenomenological method that are discussed briefly later.

A footnote to the first sentence of the lectures reads simply, "A new elaboration [Ausarbeitung; more literally, "working out"] of division 3 of part 1 of Being and Time."

The outline of the projected lectures in the introduction has three parts, each with four chapters: Part 1, a historical introduction; Part 2, the direct discussion of being; and Part 3, a treatment of phenomenology and its method. The lectures go only as far as the first chapter of Part 2, which discusses the ontological difference. The next (and undelivered and unpublished) chapter was entitled "The Problem of the Basic Articulation of Being." And the successive two chapters were to treat the unity of being and the truth of being.

See the discussion of thematization and objectification in science in *Being and Time* (BT 412–15). In *Being and Time* Heidegger never discusses the "scientific" and objective status of fundamental ontology, but he does discuss it briefly in *Basic Problems* (BP 281–2, 320–4). See also my "Problem of Indifferenz."

"Existence [Existenz] and extantness [Vorhandensein] are more disparate than, say, the determinations of the God's being and man's being in traditional ontology" (BP 176).

See the treatment of categories and existentialia in *Being and Time*, §9.