Where should a history of the phenomenology of temporality begin? Strictly speaking, phenomenology in the distinctive sense that it has today starts with Edmund Husserl. Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty are then among those who subsequently self-identified as phenomenologists, although Heidegger’s connection to Husserl makes that label problematic. Any such history would have to recognize, however, that phenomenology emerges from a longer and wider tradition that includes major figures such as Immanuel Kant as well as Husserl’s precursors and near contemporaries such as William James or Franz Brentano.

This chapter begins accordingly with an introductory account of Kant in the first section, followed by a discussion of Heidegger’s reading of Kant in the second section, and of the development of the early Heidegger’s own efforts at explaining temporality in the third section. In the broadest terms, the principal thread is the search for the source of temporality. Although vastly different in style from Proust’s project of searching for lost time, the philosophical search for the source of time is similar in its goals. Proust’s project is informed, after all, by Bergson’s theory of temporality, as we will see in later chapters. The question raised by both literature and philosophy concerns time’s passing, and how to reconcile ourselves to it. The philosophical project is to construct a theory
that recognizes temporality as an unavoidable feature of experience. What must be explained is our sense both that time is independent of us and that our experience introduces qualitative elements into the experience of temporality.

In more technical terms, the question in the Kantian tradition is whether time is mind dependent or mind independent. Kant seems to have wanted to have it both ways, so the question in the first section is whether he succeeded. In the second section we will discuss Heidegger’s interpretation whereby Kant missed his own cue when in rewriting the first *Critique* Kant played down the role of the imagination in the production of temporal experience. In the third section Heidegger’s own analysis of the temporality of phenomena such as joy, anxiety, and boredom is examined to see how he argues for his inversion of the problem. On his account, the question is not whether time is mind dependent or mind independent, but whether mind is dependent on or independent of a prior temporalization of the world.

The purpose of these accounts is not to explore all the complexities of Kant and Heidegger scholarship, but to highlight what is involved in the project of searching for the source of time. Later chapters go into detail about how these and other philosophers viewed the different dimensions of time—present, past, and future. These opening accounts of Kant and Heidegger are intended to provide a framework for the subsequent investigations of these three dimensions of temporality and the particular problems that go along with each of them.

**Kant on the Source of Time**

What is the source of time? If that seems like a strange question, try thinking about what the source of temporality might be. Consider the distinction that I stipulated in the introduction between the time of the universe as opposed to the temporality of our lives. Given the question about the source of temporality, this distinction
between objective time and lived temporality implies that there are only two possibilities for the source of time, the world or ourselves. If temporality is the time of our lives, as opposed to the time of the universe, then a plausible answer is that temporality comes from us, unlike time, which must come from the universe. Philosophy is not so easily satisfied, however, by such a quick answer to the question. Philosophical conscience forces a further question: what is meant by “comes from us”? This question in turn divides into two others: (1) who is this “we”? and (2) what does “comes from” mean?

Kant and Heidegger are two philosophers who answer these questions differently, despite Heidegger’s attempt to elicit his own view from Kant. Although Kant criticizes Descartes for starting from the “I think” or the cogito, Kant himself reduces all that “we” are empirically to a transcendental “I,” which he calls the “transcendental unity of apperception.” This unity is the purely formal principle of the identity of experience and is completely empty of content. Why is unity so important, then, and what is its relevance to Kant’s explanation of time? Kant’s method of explanation of the genesis of experience is called “faculty psychology.” If at first glance it does not seem promising to maintain that this transcendental unity of apperception could be the source of time, nevertheless, Kant does entertain the thought that the mind is the source of time, as I will now explain.

Kant’s faculty psychology is the precursor of modern cognitive science insofar as he is the first philosopher to use a computational model to explain the mind’s production of experience. In this type of explanation, the mind is not a tabula rasa, an empty slate, or a black box, as it is for the empiricists. On the empiricists’ model, the mind’s reception of data is already experienced. For Kant, in contrast, experience is the output of a complicated prior process of “synthesis,” which produces experience but is not itself experienced. The input, which also is not experienced as such, he calls intuition, and it “comes from” the faculty of sensibility. At first this
input is an undigested multiplicity of sensations. This input must therefore be “unified” or “synthesized” in Kantian terminology, or “processed” in more recent terminology, by being brought under concepts supplied by the faculty of the understanding. Thus, the data come from the world and the concepts from the mind. These are the only two possibilities, and Kant maintains that concepts without intuitions are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind. For Kant—who does not yet distinguish time from temporality in the manner of the later phenomenologists—the source of time must be either the world or the mind. That is to say, time must be either real or ideal. It must be either mind independent or mind dependent.

Which is it? Kant’s answer is that time is not a concept, but neither is it the content of an intuition. Instead, he calls it a form of intuition. If the only two possibilities are concepts and intuitions, what does he mean by this idea of form? In the “Transcendental Aesthetic” of the first Critique he offers some arguments for why time is not a concept and why it is also not an intuited content. Time is not the content of intuition because time is (a) not empirical, and (b) necessary. That time is not empirical means that it cannot be perceived. That time is necessary means that although there could be time in the absence of appearances, there could not be any appearances without time. Necessity, furthermore, cannot be determined from empirical matters only, but is contributed by the mind. Time is not a concept primarily because it is a unitary phenomenon, which Kant calls a singularity, since the parts of time are all in one time. Insofar as concepts capture only generalities, not singularities, time then cannot be a concept. Kant decides to call time a form of intuition because all experiences are temporal (determined as successive in time), even if only some experiences involve time directly.

As a response to the question of where time comes from, the answer that time is a form of intuition might appear to be trying to have it both ways. On the one hand, insofar as time is a form of
intuition, it comes from the mind. On the other hand, however, insofar as it is a form of intuition, and intuition receives data from the real world, time is empirically real. Kant is thus in some respects an idealist about time insofar as he claims that time is mind dependent, and in other respects he is not an idealist. He maintains that he can be both an empirical realist about time, insofar as he regards time as independently real, and a transcendental idealist about time, insofar as he regards time as ultimately mind dependent.

What “idealism” means in the Kantian framework is obviously quite complex. Kant mentions several kinds of idealism in the Critique of Pure Reason, including his own transcendental idealism. Kant’s critique of Descartes in the “Refutation of Idealism” depends on viewing Descartes as what Kant calls a problematic idealist. Unlike the dogmatic idealist, Berkeley, who denies the existence of objects in space, the problematic idealist merely doubts their existence. Kant’s strategy is then to turn the tables on this version of empirical idealism by proving that “even our inner experience, undoubted by Descartes, is possible only under the presupposition of outer experience” (B275). Kant believes that it is a “scandal of philosophy and universal human reason” that we lack a proof of the external world.3

Indeed, there is a question about what is even meant by common terms like “external” or images of the “things outside us.” Such phrases could mean experience of “objects as outer” or they could mean, more strongly, experience of “mind-independent things.” Hallucinations, for instance, are cases of the former but not of the latter. What has to be proved is that there is input and that experience is not coming from me alone. Thus, even if I am a brain in a vat and am deceptively programmed by an evil genius with false input, there must be (1) external input (even if it is illusory), and (2) objective orderability. Inner experience is orderable (determined in time) only if an outer order is being experienced.4 If experience were completely chaotic, I could not distinguish inner and outer, and I probably could not talk about an “I” at all. Even
an experience of the inner, such as a hallucination, is objective in the sense that it must be orderable as internal. I say of a particular experience that it is just a hallucination and only inner, because I know that it is not orderable along with outer experience. That is why people can know that they are having hallucinations. They can know that they are hallucinating because at some level they intuit that these experiences could not be externally real.5

If one were to ask which experiences are really outside, the answer would depend on what “outside” means. On Kant’s account, objectivity implies orderability, where orderability is time-determination. What this means is that for Kant the outside is determined not by direct perception but by application of the rules of experience. The rules, and not some manner of introspecting the phenomenon, determine what counts as being outside and what does not. Kant also believes, however, that the representation of something persistent is not a persisting representation. Whereas the former is invariably fleeting and changeable, it necessarily refers to something that persists without being represented itself. In the section of the Critique of Pure Reason called the First Analogy, Kant identifies the source of this persistence as substance. Let me review Kant’s argument for persisting substance with the purpose of eliciting what that argument tells us further about his conception of time.

Berkeley maintained that to be is to be perceived. But, says Kant in the first Critique (B225), time cannot be perceived. Does that entail, then, that time does not exist? The answer is no: the nonexistence of time does not follow from our inability to perceive it. For Kant, the main reason time cannot be perceived is because although perception is constantly changing, time itself does not change. Time is the framework for all perception, or more precisely, the condition for the perception of any object whatsoever, including temporality.

This argument represents a revolutionary perspective on time. Instead of talking about the nature of time as it is in itself, Kant
focuses attention on time as a function of our minds. This is the first step beyond a metaphysics of time and toward a phenomenology of temporality. Kant is, of course, a metaphysician and he does want to say that there are respects in which we must view ourselves as standing outside of time. In the moral sphere, for instance, when we judge an action to be right or wrong, we do so by projecting a conception of ourselves as moral legislators who are above time, deciding forever and always on the moral rule involved in action. In the metaphysical sphere, furthermore, Kant does argue for the existence of an immortal soul, although from a moral point of view only. Although we cannot have knowledge of our immortality, Kant maintains that we have to believe that we have an immortal soul insofar as we believe we can be moral agents. The argument starts from the premise that we cannot try to do something we believe to be impossible. Insofar as we act morally, we are trying to achieve something roughly like moral perfection. But because moral backsliding is always possible, achieving this end would require an infinite amount of time. Therefore, wanting to be moral requires us to believe that we have immortal souls.

These considerations are pertinent to the present inquiry, however, only to the extent that they indicate some reasons Kant may have for saying that the self is both constrained by time and independent of time. If the mind is the origin of time, that does not make time any less real for us. The finitude of the mind is characterized not by the limitations on life, but by the time-bound nature of experience. Time is an a priori condition of every experience, even if it is not thematized in the experience.

What does this account of time tell us about Kant’s understanding of temporality? For one thing, turning idealism’s game against itself shows that whereas Cartesianism holds that “the only immediate experience is inner experience” and that outer experience is only mediated or inferred, for Kant the only immediate experience is outer experience and inner experience is only mediated (B276–277). Kant does not think that this turning of the tables
means that we are not conscious of our own existence. That minimal sense of subjectivity is still preserved. Only a very minimal sense is preserved, it must be noted, because all that follows is that a subject exists. We are told nothing about what it is. That is to say, we do not thereby have experience (empirical cognition) of anything about the subject in itself (B277). All this reversal of Cartesianism entails is that “inner intuition, i.e., time” is possible only because outer objects are known to exist immediately (B277). Kant also maintains that persisting matter is not inferred a posteriori or “drawn from outer experience” (B278). On the contrary, it is an a priori presupposition as “the necessary condition of all time-determination, thus also as the determination of inner sense in regard to our own existence through the existence of outer things” (B278). “Persistence” is explained a priori (as substance), and is not obtained from outer experience. Persistence is not actually perceived, but it is a condition for the possibility of any particular perception (e.g., perception of change).

In the “Refutation of Idealism” the crucial question concerns why Kant thought that the persistent had to be external substance. Why could the persistent not be something more “inner” rather than “outer,” more “subjective” than “objective” (to use some problematic terms)? Two perfectly good internal candidates for the persistent (or the “permanent” according to some translations) in experience are time and the “I think.” Let me discuss time first. According to the “Transcendental Aesthetic,” time is the essential feature of inner sense, and all experience involves inner sense (whereas only some experiences involve outer sense). Time is therefore a feature of every experience. Would not time be, then, a good candidate for the permanent backdrop for perception, which is, of course, not perceived as such? Kant’s rejection of this possibility is stated forcefully and clearly. “Time,” he writes in the A edition, “has in it nothing abiding, and hence gives cognition only of a change of determinations, but not of the determinable object” (A381). Here there might seem to be a metaphysical issue about the nature of
time insofar as this claim that time “has in it nothing abiding” seems to contradict his other claim that time is the permanent framework that makes experience possible. Note, however, that he says “in it” (where “it” refers to time). Does that tell us whether time itself is changing or unchanging? One current reading is that the framework of time is always there (although it is not perceived), but within that framework the content is always changing. His argument is drawing not so much on the metaphysics of time per se, however, as on the phenomenology of time-determination. If time changed every moment, then there would be nothing that could feature in each and every experience. The point is rather that time, which has in it “nothing abiding,” could not be determined, that is, experiences could not be ordered, except against an unchanging backdrop, which must be substance and not time.

Accepting this argument does not lead right away to the confirmation of external substance as the permanent backdrop. Another internal candidate could be the “I think” itself. In fact, insofar as the “I think” must be able to accompany all my experiences, and is thus a permanent framework for experience, it would seem to be an even better candidate for the permanent. Kant rejects the cogito as the source of persistence, however, for much the same reason as he rejects time as the permanent. The above quotation then continues, “For in that which we call the soul, everything is in continual flux, and it has nothing abiding, except perhaps (if one insists) the I, which is simple only because this representation has no content, and hence, no manifold, on account of which it seems to represent a simple object, or better put, it seems to designate one” (A381; emphasis added). There is “nothing abiding,” then, either in time or in the mind. In the Paralogisms he also asserts: “But now we have in inner intuition nothing at all that persists, for the I is only the consciousness of my thinking” (B413). In context, his reason for asserting that permanence is not given in inner intuition is that he wants to show that the oneness or unity of consciousness does not prove the existence of a permanent self (B420). The
unity is not an intuition of the subject as object (B422). The purely formal “I” is the same in every experience, and does not have any content that could stay the same. Persisting or abiding content is required if I am to be able to perceive temporal difference, for instance, by determining that there were two separate events and that one came before the other. Thus, he says that the representation “I” is not an intuition but “a merely intellectual representation of the self-activity of a thinking subject” (B278). As such an empty thought, the “I” provides nothing that could be the basis for the persistence that makes possible the perception of motion and change.

Insight into Kant’s understanding of the nature of subjectivity can be gained most directly from the Transcendental Deduction of the first Critique. What is “deduced” in that section of the Transcendental Analytic? In contrast to the Refutation of Idealism, which shows that there is no “I” without an “It,” the Transcendental Deduction can be summed up as a proof that there is no “It” without an “I.” These slogans may be useful pedagogically to sum up Kant’s complex and prolix text, but they can also be misleadingly simple. For instance, the “I” in each case is different. The “I” in the Refutation of Idealism is the subjectivity that can be introspected, the empirical ego. In contrast, the “I” in the Transcendental Deduction is the transcendental ego, the subjectivity that is doing the introspection. This difference could also be characterized as the difference between the constituting consciousness and the constituted consciousness. Kant wants to establish that whereas the input through sensible intuition is a manifold, the output that is actually experienced (whether inner or outer) has a unity to it (or better, a oneness). Where does the oneness come from? It could not come from the intuitions, which are a multiplicity. Even the concepts are multiple. The oneness of experienced output, on this model, would not be possible unless a single processor synthesized the manifold.

Clearly this metaphor of a combinatory processor has its limitations, however helpful it might be in revealing the differences
between Kant and his predecessors. There are questions, for instance, about whether the hardware or the software is the source of the oneness or unity. Even if the software is the processor, there is still a question about whether the metaphor captures distinctions about consciousness adequately. The relation of the transcendental ego and the empirical ego, for instance, is not to be thought of as the relation of a container to the contained. Admittedly, it is hard not to think of the relation that way when Kant himself says things like “all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the ‘I think’ in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered” (B132). This way of putting the point makes the introspected content seem as if it is encountered “in” the mind. In the same breath Kant will also reverse the containment relation and make it seem as if the “I think” is contained in experience, when he says that “in all consciousness [the ‘I think’] is one and the same” (B132). The little word “in” is thus troublesome insofar as it can suggest the relation of spatial containment, which Kant does not want to imply, as well as what he does mean to suggest, which is more on the order of logical implication. Perhaps this line could have been better rendered in English as, “throughout all consciousness the ‘I think’ is one and the same.” The German does say, however, “in allem Bewusstsein ein und dasselbe ist,” so both the Kemp Smith and the Guyer/Wood translations are correct to use the word “in.” A careful reader should be aware, however, that the word does not necessarily connote spatial containment.

In sum, the principle of persistence is not and cannot be “in me,” and it cannot be either “the I of apperception” or “time.” Inner sense is constantly changing, but to be able to say this, there has to be something that is not changing (B277). This cannot be the “I,” because there is no intuition of the “I.” Kant concludes then that the “I think” as a persisting formal framework would be empty of content and would not suffice as the persistent background for temporal discrimination. How would one know, say, that there
were two empty moments in succession? Nothing plus nothing is nothing.

**Heidegger’s Reading of Kant**

Where, then, does time come from? What connects the stream of consciousness? What makes experience a unity such that we can know that time is continuous and that there is only one world? Kant’s masterful move is to claim to be *both* a realist and an idealist, but not in the same way. Here is where the previously mentioned distinction between empirical realism and transcendental idealism comes in. Kant wants to be an empirical realist, and thus neither a dogmatic empirical idealist like Berkeley, who denies external substance, nor a problematic empirical idealist like Descartes, who doubts the external world. Kant maintains that the only way to be an empirical realist is to be a transcendental idealist.

What does it mean to be a transcendental idealist specifically about the nature of time? Perhaps the most radical answer to this question in the history of the reception of Kant is Martin Heidegger’s reading of Kant on time in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Published initially in 1929, shortly after his publication in 1927 of his major work, *Being and Time*, this so-called *Kantbuch* is intended to provide a more basic understanding of philosophy by revealing the links between Kantian transcendental philosophy and Husserlian phenomenology. These were the dominant approaches to philosophy in Heidegger’s day, and what they both missed, according to Heidegger, was the fundamental importance of temporality. Heidegger was intensely preoccupied with time during the 1920s. Kant’s writings on time provided the crucial backdrop for Heidegger until he foregrounded them in this study. In particular, Heidegger’s Kant book can be considered as a study of the section of the first *Critique* called the “Schematism.” This section of the *Critique* explains how time is added to intuitions and
concepts as the transcendental machinery cranks out experience through the various levels of processing. In any case, Kant clearly had become the test for any philosophical account of time.

In this section I will argue two theses. First, I will try to explain briefly why even if the Kant book is mistaken as a reading of Kant, it nevertheless illustrates the difference between the Husserlian and the Kantian approaches to time constitution. Second, I want to establish that this reading of Kant shows how Heidegger’s project of explaining temporality “errs” as a general philosophical project. “To err” is not the same as to be in error in a way that could lead, say, to failing a test. It could also mean something like going in a different direction from standard ways of thinking, or uncovering insights that are buried in the text. In this section, I will be turning the charge of errancy back against not only Heidegger’s reading of Kant, but also his attempt to make temporality the foundation of metaphysics. Heidegger acknowledged the first mistake. Whether he ever saw the second errancy is more difficult to determine.

Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant was intended to be a later part of *Being and Time*, of which he published only a part. In the author’s preface to the first edition of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger says, “This interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* arose in connection with a first working-out of Part Two of *Being and Time*.“⁶ In this part he intended to deconstruct and even to destroy the history of philosophy through a series of readings that would show where previous philosophers failed to do philosophy right, that is, where they fell short of doing philosophy in Heidegger’s way and therefore where they went wrong in their analyses of fundamental phenomena, particularly time and temporality. In *Being and Time* he says that the purpose of this destruction is not simply to “shake off” the tradition, but to shake it up. “This hardened tradition must be loosened up,” he says, in order to discover new possibilities that are contained in it but that have been occluded by the standard interpretations.⁷
In the author’s preface to the second edition of the Kant book in 1950, Heidegger acknowledges the charge of Ernst Cassirer and other critics that his readings do violence to the historical texts. He justifies this violence as the supposedly inevitable result of trying to engage the texts in a thinking that could give rise to new philosophical insights. “A thoughtful dialogue,” he remarks, “is bound by other laws.”8 The “other laws” are presumably the laws not of accurate philology but of good philosophy. He then gives his mea culpa: “The instances in which I have gone astray and the shortcomings of the present endeavor have become so clear to me on the path of thinking during the period [since its first publication] that I therefore refuse to make this work into a patchwork by compensating with supplements, appendices, and postscripts. Thinkers learn from their shortcomings to be more persevering.”9

At issue in Heidegger’s reading of Kant is the importance that Heidegger gives to the faculty of the mind Kant calls the imagination. Kant himself deemphasizes the role of the imagination in the B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Heidegger faces a long tradition of Kant scholarship that maintains that the B edition transforms the “psychological” arguments of the A edition into more properly “logical” arguments. Heidegger, in contrast, sees the B edition as even more psychological than the A edition, and in any case, for Heidegger the distinction between the psychological and the logical misses the point of both editions, which is to be “transcendental.”10 The transcendental is both “subjective” and “objective,” depending on whether the focus is on inner or outer experience. On Heidegger’s reading, the main difference between the two editions is the shift from the pure power of the imagination to the pure understanding as the central faculty of “transcendence.” Transcendence is synonymous with the “possibility of experience.”11 In The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger explains that transcendence, or Being-in-the-world, in contrast to intentionality for Husserl, is not a movement from interior to exterior.12 Transcendence first constitutes the subjectivity of a
subject and makes the intentional distinction between interior and exterior possible.

Kant scholars must of course heed the self-understanding of the master, and thus Cassirer and others cannot take Heidegger’s reading seriously. From the point of view of a history of ways of understanding temporality, however, Heidegger’s Kant book represents a unique account of time constitution. Whether the theory advanced is Kant’s own understanding or merely Heidegger’s “errancy” is beside the point. For present purposes, Heidegger’s Kant book can be regarded as confronting two different traditions of theorizing the connection between time and the mind. The first approach is through faculty psychology. This is the Kantian approach and it is based on an understanding of the mind as the interaction of what Kant called “faculties.” Faculty psychology sees time as being added by one particular part of the mind to the output of each and every moment of experience.

In contrast to this atomistic account of the source of time, there is a more holistic model of the mind that sees time differently. Call this the “duration” account because it accounts for time as duration rather than as a series of moments. The two principal theorists of duration that I will be discussing in more detail below are Husserl and Bergson.

Let us look first at Kantian faculty psychology. The Kantian approach of faculty psychology sees different faculties as having different functions. Sensibility, for instance, contributes the data brought under concepts by the faculty of the understanding in what Kant calls synthesis. Whereas the understanding always involves synthesis with sensibility, the faculty of reason applies concepts independently of sensibility. In addition to these three faculties, Kant also sometimes speaks of a fourth faculty, the imagination. In the first edition the imagination plays a more central role than it does in the second edition, where it is no longer described as a separate faculty (although its importance is reestablished in Kant’s discussion of judgment, including aesthetic judgment in particular).
In the A edition of the first *Critique* Kant maintains, according to Heidegger, that what orders experience temporally is not sensibility, understanding, or reason, but the imagination. The imagination adds time to the synthesis of intuitions (data) and the categories (concepts). As a result of such a synthesis, each moment of experience is a unit of a single time.

In today’s terms the Kantian faculties might be called “modules.” Using metaphors for the mind drawn from computer science, contemporary cognitive psychology often speaks of modules that operate below the level of consciousness. These modular “subprocessors” then filter the data and “synthesize” or process it into a form recognizable by a higher-level processor. Kant hypothesizes three levels of such cognitive processing or synthesis. Each one of these levels of synthesis is, in Heidegger’s terms, “time-forming.” Heidegger’s claim is that these activities are the source of time in its various dimensions. Although he cannot find much textual evidence in the first *Critique* itself, he finds at least some grounds in Kant’s *Lectures on Metaphysics* for thinking of these three syntheses as forming respectively the three temporal modalities of present, past, and future.14

Thus, the first level is the synthesis of apprehension. This is where the data get entered. Perception is a paradigm case of this type of synthesis. More to the point, this level of synthesis produces or forms time as the series of Nows. It is thus the source of the present with which we “reckon,” even if “this sequence of nows, however, is in no way time in its originality.”15 By the term “original,” I take Heidegger to be saying that for Kant the *source* of time is the transcendental power of imagination, which allows this experience of time as a sequence of Nows to “spring forth.”16 Heidegger underscores the role of imagination in the formation of time when he says, “If the transcendental power of imagination, as the pure, forming faculty, in itself forms time—i.e., allows time to spring forth—then we cannot avoid the thesis [that] the transcendental power of imagination is original time.”17
The synthesis of reproduction takes place when the input is reprocessed in the absence of the source of the data. Reproduction is “bringing-forth-again,” and is, accordingly, “a kind of unifying.” What kind of unifying does Heidegger mean, exactly? The argument he gives is that the mind must not “lose from thought” that which “differentiates time.” In other words, if the mind did not know the difference between thoughts that it was having now and thoughts that it had earlier, that earlier experience would be lost completely. Heidegger sees this mode of synthesis as essential to the oneness and unity of experience:

the pure power of imagination, with regard to this mode of synthesis, is time-forming. It can be called pure “reproduction” not because it attends to a being which is gone nor because it attends to it as something experienced earlier. Rather, . . . it opens up in general the horizon of the possible attending-to, the having-been-ness, and so it “forms” this “after” as such.

Whereas the synthesis of apprehension forms experience into a sequence of Nows, the synthesis of reproduction adds the possibility of forming time into past as well as present times. The question then arises, is this characterization of time sufficient, or is a third form of synthesis needed, one that forms time into the future? Will this formation of time be as essential to experience as the present and past are?

Heidegger would like the text to show that the future is formed in the synthesis of recognition, which is the level where self-consciousness begins to play more of a role. He admits, however, that there is little or no textual evidence in the first Critique for the temporal interpretation that he wants to give the synthesis of recognition as futural. Indeed, Anglophone commentators often read the synthesis of recognition as an argument for the necessity of the transcendental unity of apperception, which is in some sense outside of or independent from time. Heidegger’s preoccupation with time leads him to read Kant’s argument for the synthesis as
amounting to an argument for the need for the future in order to make sense of the analysis that was just provided for the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction. Heidegger therefore claims that although the synthesis of recognition is third in the order of exposition of the syntheses, in terms of logical priority it comes before the other two syntheses. Heidegger sees the third synthesis as “in fact the first.”

“It pops up in advance of them,” he asserts, and the arguments for the necessity of Abildung, or likeness, and Nachbildung, or reproduction, depend on the argument for Vorbildung, or prefiguration. Let’s see how Heidegger forces a temporal dimension on Kant’s text.

“Without consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before,” writes Kant, “all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain” (A103). Heidegger adds that something could not be thought to be the same except against a backdrop that also remains the same. This empirical claim leads to the idea of a more general or “pure” horizon of “being-able-to-hold-something-before-us [Vorhaltbarkeit].” This Vorhaltbarkeit amounts to a Vorhaften, a preliminary attaching or a prefigurative grasping. The “vor” suggests a projection of a future in this fore-structuring of experience. Heidegger therefore concludes that the synthesis of recognition is time-forming and the time that it forms is the future: this synthesis, he says, “explores in advance . . . what must be held before us in advance as the same in order that the apprehending and reproducing syntheses in general can find a closed, circumscribed field of beings within which they can attach to what they bring forth and encounter, so to speak, and take them in stride as beings.” Because the first two syntheses presuppose this third synthesis, Heidegger believes that he can even maintain that the future has logical priority over the present and the past. He thus derives from Kant a transcendental argument for the primacy of the future. The argument is that because there is no self without time, and no time without a future, therefore, there is no self without a future. This
argument is remarkably different in character from the argument for the primacy of the future that he developed in *Being and Time*. There he showed the priority of the future through the more existential account of being-toward-death. Discussion of these different approaches will have to wait until chapter 4, which deals with the future.

For now, I need to explain the case that Heidegger makes for the first premise, which concerns the relation of time to the self. Given the ideas of time and the “I think,” which is the source of which for Kant? Heidegger discusses this issue in reference to Kant’s famous sentence about the mind-dependency of time: “Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensible, i.e., insofar as we are affected by objects), and in itself, outside the subject, is nothing” (A35/B51). If Kant appears to be pulling the rug out from underneath himself here, one must remember that in addition to being an empirical realist about time, he is also a transcendental idealist, and it is as the latter that he is speaking at this point in the text.

Taking off from this striking claim, Heidegger provides an even more astonishing account of time as the source of the self. As a faculty psychologist, Kant is normally thought to be saying that time is subjective in the sense that the subject generates experience by imposing the form of time on the data of intuition. Heidegger, however, reverses the relation and suggests that time is the source of subjectivity. He makes a good point when he says that time is not something that affects a self that is already “at hand.” The self is not a distinct object or, as Heidegger would say, a *vorhanden* present-to-hand thing, to which time could then be attributed as if time were a property that an object could or could not possess. Heidegger then suggests, however, that “time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity.” A thoughtful reader might well wonder whether time is the sort of thing that could be a self-affecting activity or that could turn into subjectivity. But on Heidegger’s reading, one thing should be clear, namely, that Kant
is neither an idealist nor a realist about time. The debate between realists and idealists is about whether the mind or the world is the source of time. An idealist maintains that time is imposed by the mind on experience. An idealist could not make the curious assertion that Heidegger attributes to Kant, namely, that time is what makes self-consciousness possible, and that it “first makes the mind into a mind.”

If an idealist could not make this assertion that time is the source of mind, could a realist make it? One might think so, because if time comes before subjectivity, then it is more real than subjectivity. Insofar as realism says that to be real is to be in time and space, however, this position could not be a form of realism. To say that time was real would be a category mistake that confused a necessary condition of reality with something that was itself real. In any case, the idea that temporality is the source of time raises questions that are prior to the realist–idealistic debate.

Heidegger therefore positions his reading of Kant before the distinction between realism and idealism can get a foothold. Time is not in the mind, but rather is the ground for the possibility of the mind and the self. Because the temporal movement “‘from-out-of-itself-toward . . . and back-to-itself’ first constitutes the mental character of the mind as a finite self,” time and the “I think” are not at odds with each other, but “they are the same.” What does this mean? One thing to note is that when Heidegger speaks of “the mind,” he is speaking loosely, insofar as his theory does not allow him to use the term, and it is not a technical term of Kant’s either. Another point to note is that Heidegger is not identifying the transcendental unity of apperception with “the mind.” For him, the mind is empirical consciousness, whereas the “I think” is not a content of consciousness but rather a condition of it. In the previous quotation Heidegger even says explicitly that the pure self-affection of original time is not the self-positing of a preexisting mind among others, but rather that it “first constitutes the mental character of the mind as a finite self.” Thus, subjectivity
does not exist prior to original time, but is made possible only through original time. Both time and the I of pure apperception are said to be fixed, unchanging, and perduring. These characteristics are usually attributed to mental substance, but Heidegger’s Kant does not believe in mental substance. Heidegger is instead hypothesizing that what Kant really wants to say is the following:

for Kant only wants to say with this that neither the I nor time is “in time.” To be sure. But does it follow from this that the I is not temporal, or does it come about directly that the I is so “temporal” that it is time itself, and that only as time itself, according to its ownmost essence, does it become possible?

Heidegger grants that this interpretation does violence to Kant, and that Kant does not expressly see this himself, and that Kant was “unable to say more about this.” Heidegger then points to his own *Being and Time* as the standpoint from which to see how laying the ground for metaphysics “grows upon the ground of time.”

Heidegger’s turn away from the Kantian style of philosophy and especially from the use of theoretically laden terms such as “subjectivity,” “consciousness,” and even “experience” is motivated by an increasing skepticism about the idea of experience experiencing itself. The point of *Being and Time* is to avoid the Cartesian problems that result from using these terms, and to create a new vocabulary for phenomenological analysis. This change of vocabulary will enable Heidegger to think about issues of time and temporality differently, both in style and in substance. Now is the time, then, to turn to Heidegger’s own phenomenology of temporality in *Being and Time*, with some considerations about the development of his innovative theory.

The Early Heidegger

Although Heidegger began publishing on time as early as 1915 in “The Concept of Time in the Science of History,” his analyses more
clearly resemble those of *Being and Time* in lectures from 1924 and 1925, including *The Concept of Time, The History of the Concept of Time*, and also “Wilhelm Dilthey’s Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview.” There are also important clarifications in lectures given shortly after *Being and Time*, including *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1927) and *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (1929). The foregoing explication of Heidegger’s analysis of Kant in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* left us hanging on Heidegger’s curious but fascinating remark about time and the I of apperception being the same. To see what he means and why he said what he did, it is important to understand Heidegger’s phenomenology of temporality, especially in *Being and Time* and these other early writings on temporality. Heidegger’s intention is to show that Kant’s way of thinking about time and space is derived from what Heidegger calls a more “primordial” level of questioning. In contrast to Kant’s transcendental arguments, which show that if something is required for knowledge then something else is also required, Heidegger’s derivation arguments try to reverse the ontological ordering of the terms of analysis. From the Kantian perspective, time in the objective Newtonian sense of the present-to-hand (*vorhanden*) universe comes before (i.e., is logically prior to) the human, qualitative experience of temporal moments. Heidegger inverts that ordering and argues not that objective, clock time does not exist, but that objective time is not intelligible without Dasein’s prior qualitative temporality. Heidegger’s project in *Being and Time* (1927) is to show that starting from objective time, the philosopher will not be able to explain qualitative temporality, but starting from qualitative temporality, the philosopher can explain objective time.

In the Dilthey paper of 1925 Heidegger remarks that “we ourselves are time.” Because at that point Heidegger does not distinguish consistently between “time” and “temporality,” there is an ambiguity in this claim that we are time. From this assertion what
is not clear is whether it is the public “we” or each private individual that is time. When he says in his more technical language, therefore, that “in each case Dasein itself is time,” the phrase “in each case” suggests that time is relative to each particular Dasein. This clarification leads to a further problem, however, insofar as it implies that there are as many different times as there are lives. This claim would be hard to reconcile with the standard Kantian intuition that time is one.

To sort out this problem, we must first ask whether the “is” in the expression “Dasein is time” is the “is” of identity or the “is” of predication. Heidegger should not mean the “is” of predication, or he would be back in the Kantian camp of faculty psychology whereby time is a feature that is applied by one faculty (whether the imagination or the understanding) to another faculty (sensibility). That Heidegger means something as strong as an identity claim is indicated when he says, “Human life does not happen in time but rather is time itself.” In his more technical language he writes, “The being-there of Dasein is nothing other than being-time. Time is not something that I encounter out there in the world, but is what I myself am.” Thus, time is encountered neither as an entity outside in the world, nor as something that whirs away inside consciousness. On this formulation I note that it also does not seem possible to ask which comes first, Dasein or temporality. As a result, the neo-Kantian effort in Being and Time to “deduce” one from the other turns out to be unnecessary.

Nevertheless, Heidegger offers a reasonably straightforward argument for the prioritization of temporality over Dasein. Being and Time states clearly that “Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and as such it makes possible the Constitution of the structure of care.” “Care” is a technical term that means that Dasein is always a being-in-the-world whose relation to the world makes Dasein what it is. In other words, Dasein is necessarily care. Heidegger’s first premise is thus that time makes care possible. He then infers from the fact that care is what Dasein is
that time also makes Dasein possible. Heidegger maintains further that temporality’s temporalizing makes possible “the multiplicity of Dasein’s modes of Being, and especially the basic possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence.” Temporality thus leads to making the distinction between authentic and inauthentic, as an example will soon illustrate. Although Heidegger denies that “authentic” and “inauthentic” are value-laden terms, they clearly indicate different ways of caring. Authenticity is a way of caring about death, whereas inauthenticity tries not to care about it. These different ways of caring could be called “normativity,” and thus temporality is shown to make normativity possible.

One problem with this argument is that if Dasein is care, then by saying that care is possible only through Dasein’s temporalizing, Heidegger seems to be caught in a tautology. He would then be saying vacuously that Dasein makes Dasein possible. Heidegger’s attempt to work out this puzzle is advanced somewhat by his analysis in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1927), which are lectures that he gave during the year in which *Being and Time* was published. *Basic Problems* distinguishes between *Temporalität* and *Zeitlichkeit*. Both are translated as “temporality,” but Albert Hofstadter, the translator, capitalizes Temporality when it means *Temporalität* and lets the lower-case stand for *Zeitlichkeit*. Thus, *Temporalität* is the Temporality that makes a priori knowledge of the objective possible and *Zeitlichkeit* is the ontological temporality of the understanding of being. The lectures break off before this distinction can be developed much more than to say that “time” is the most a priori phenomenon, “earlier than any possible earlier of whatever sort, because it is the basic condition for an earlier as such.”

This argument is problematic on two counts. First, in using the term “time” here, Heidegger’s claim becomes ambiguous because it does not specify which of the two senses of time is meant. One assumes that by “time” in this sentence he means temporality in the sense of *Zeitlichkeit* insofar as this is what temporalizes itself
sich zeitigt). Second, Heidegger maintains that the term “a priori” means “earlier” in a temporal sense. “A priori” means “earlier,” he says, and “earlier” is “patently a time-determination.” This claim could well be suspected of confusing the “temporally prior” with the “logically prior.” He explains, however, that he does not mean to say that a priori conditions are “temporally” prior in the sense where “temporally” implies “before” in the ordinary, “intratemporal” understanding of time as a succession of moments in which we stand. But at the more fundamental level where “temporality [Zeitlichkeit] temporalizes itself,” he mocks the tradition for not realizing that “it cannot be denied that a time-determination is present in the concept of the a priori, the earlier.” Even with this qualification, though, Heidegger still appears to be confusing “priority” in the logical sense with “priority” in the temporal sense. Although Heidegger is thus wrong, given current practice, on this question of word usage, he is right on the more important point that the aprioricity of the Temporal does not make it ontically the first being, because time is not a being at all. As such, time cannot be said to be ontically “forever and eternal.” What is normally thought to be the case when ontic time no longer obtains is not clear in any case. Cold ashes in the motionless void, one supposes.

In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929), Heidegger adds some analyses that illustrate and indirectly clarify his statement that “temporality temporalizes.” The topic is boredom. This starting point might seem to be an arbitrary and inauspicious basis for a theory of human existence insofar as boredom is merely one among many subjective states of mind in which one can find oneself. Heidegger’s intention, however, is to show how attending directly to a phenomenon like boredom and avoiding the Cartesian vocabulary of consciousness will be more useful than assuming from the start that boredom is a merely subjective state of mind. Such an assumption presupposes an unbridgeable gap between subjective experience, to which the subject is the only one who has
access, and objective experience, which is accessible from many points of view, including natural science. 51

Heidegger challenges the method that presupposes this gap. He maintains that this method treats our access to consciousness as itself something that can be made into an object for what he calls an “ascertaining” consciousness. “Ascertaining” tries to bring consciousness itself to consciousness and does not recognize that this objectifying attempt in fact alters or destroys the phenomenon in question. 52 Instead of this mode of false reification, Heidegger argues for a phenomenological approach that he calls “awakening.” The ascertaining consciousness depends on a more basic implicit understanding to which we can be awakened. In awakening, the phenomenon in question is described not to objectify it and bring it under our control, but to release it from the grip of Cartesian and Kantian theories based on the notions of subjectivity and consciousness.

Theories of consciousness focus primarily on cognition, and they tend to treat other phenomena such as moods or emotions as side issues. Heidegger, in contrast, attributes greater importance to moods and emotions, which are a function of the basic category or “existentiale” of Dasein that he calls Befindlichkeit (disposedness). Our Befindlichkeit is a function of how we find ourselves in the world, how disposed or attuned we are to the situation that enables us to be who we have been. In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics Heidegger specifies disposedness as a Grundstimmung, which means that we are never without some emotive attunement. Because it is neither entirely conscious nor unconscious, however, this basic attunement needs to be “awakened” rather than “ascertained.” The attempt to ascertain attunement by making it explicit only serves to diminish it. 53 Not an experience in the “soul,” attunement reflects how we are there—Da—in the world with one another. 54 In contrast, Verstehen or the Understanding involves projecting possibilities into the future as the basis for action. Heidegger does not assume from the start that
attunement is a merely subjective phenomenon, unlike most philosophers who see moods as only subjective. Neither merely subjective nor entirely objective, modes of attunement reveal how we find ourselves in a particular situation that both conditions what we can do and delimits what cannot be done. In *Being and Time* Heidegger focuses his discussion of attunement on fear and anxiety. Here in these lectures, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, he works instead on the mood of boredom. His intention is to show the particular connection between mood and the experience of time.

The German word for boredom is *Langeweile*, or literally a “long while.” Using boredom as the paradigm instead of anxiety, Heidegger argues that time is lengthened by boredom, and he describes some of our strategies for evading boredom by “shortening” time. With this etymological analysis of the German word for boredom, however, Heidegger runs the risk of an overly psychological argument for his derivation claim. Just because the human experience of time can be long or short, it does not follow that human temporality is more *primordial* than objective time. At this point, though, it becomes important to ask, what does “primordial” mean for Heidegger? The term can be used in at least two ways. In one sense, it means “most basic” or “ground.” In another sense, however, it merely means “without which.” The former implies that if something, call it (a), is more primordial than something else, call it (b), then (a) could obtain when (b) did not obtain. The second usage is weaker and says only that there could not be (b) unless there were (a), but not that (a) could obtain even if (b) did not. On my reading, Heidegger holds the weaker relation between time and temporality: we could not reckon with objective time without existential temporality, but temporality is not so basic a level of experience that temporality could obtain in the absence of objective time.

In *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* he acknowledges that attunement concerns specific individuals, and thus seems psychological. He also thinks, however, that as “primordial,” profound
boredom makes psychology and psychoanalysis both possible and necessary. This boredom permeates “modern man” generally and is the mood or attunement of the present age. Heidegger has thus generalized Kierkegaard’s account and extended it into a critique of modern subjectivity.

Profound boredom contrasts with two other forms of boredom. Each of these three forms of boredom has two structural features by which it manifests its concern for things and its care for itself: (1) being held in limbo, and (2) being left empty. These can also be viewed as strategies for relating to boredom. The first form of boredom is “becoming bored by” something in the world. This form of boredom seems to be caused by an object “outside” oneself such that we complain, “It’s boring!” Heidegger’s own example is a long wait for a train. One tries to escape this form of boredom by “passing the time.” For instance, while waiting for the train one might find oneself constantly looking at one’s watch. Another example might be a philosophy lecture on boredom. As the lecture drags on, one might find oneself watching how slowly the second hand of the clock on the wall moves around the dial—as if this activity will “shorten” time and make it go by faster. The characteristics of this form of boredom are the wearisome and the tedious. One is held in limbo by the wearisome situation, and the tediousness of the things that refuse to conform to one’s wishes and expectations leaves one empty.

If the world is the source of this first form of boredom, the source of the second form of boredom is more explicitly the self. This form of boredom is “being bored with” one’s self in its situation. Heidegger’s example is of a social evening that seemed to be a pleasant experience while it was occurring, but later one realizes how bored one was. Here the time is passed differently insofar as there is no behavior such as constantly looking at the clock to make time pass more quickly. Whereas the first kind of boredom arises from the world, the second form arises from Dasein. We do not say, for instance, as we might have in the first form of boredom,
“the book was boring.” Instead, now we would speak of ourselves as being boring to ourselves. Heidegger does not say so, but the quality of being boring to oneself could well make one boring to others. One sees that there is no reason in the world for being bored with the social evening, but nevertheless, one is. One is held in limbo by the standing of time, or what I will call “taking one’s time,” as if time were a commodity that one could dispense at will. By taking one’s time and wasting it as one wants, one thereby hopes to bring time to a standstill and to halt its flow. That is to say, we try to forget the future and the past, and we try to convince ourselves that all that counts is the present. But in fact time is again not under our control, and it does not vanish.

Heidegger’s third form of boredom is “profound boredom.” In this form we are indifferent both to the world and ourselves. Moreover, the connection between the self and temporality becomes markedly evident. Being held in limbo occurs in this case through the refusal to come under one’s control not of some particular thing, but of things as a whole. This way of being held in limbo leads to our being left empty in the form of a bemusement with time as a whole. The emptiness is a function of the withdrawal of everything, and the inability of anything to engage our interest and involvement. Playing on the idea of sightings (Sichten), Heidegger describes how this withdrawal takes place in each temporal dimension:

All beings withdraw from us without exception in every respect [Hinsicht], everything we look at and the way in which we look at it; everything in retrospect [Rücksicht], all beings that we look back upon as having been and having become and as past, and the way we look back at them; all beings in every prospect [Absicht], everything we look at prospectively as futural, and the way we have thus regarded them prospectively. Everything—in every respect, in retrospect and prospect, beings simultaneously withdraw. The three perspectives [Sichten] of respect, retrospect, and prospect do not belong to mere perception, nor even to theoretical or some other contemplative apprehending, but are the perspectives of all doing and activity of Dasein.
Through this withdrawing, we gain for the first time a standpoint on the entirety of all that is withdrawing. Everything has to start to withdraw for us to get a sense of the whole. Heidegger calls this grasp of the whole the *Augenblick* or moment of vision in which the unity of one’s temporality is grasped as an integral existential possibility.

Today one might think that the phenomenon that Heidegger describes as profound boredom is really clinical depression. If that were so, there would be a fairly straightforward way out of this all-pervading boredom, namely, to take an antidepressant. Heidegger would regard this manner of responding as a failure to appreciate the way attunement reveals the world as such to Dasein. To see Heidegger’s answer in 1929 one must distinguish the concept of Dasein from that of both self and subjectivity. What he wants to do is “not to describe the consciousness of man but to evoke the Dasein in man.” What is the difference between describing consciousness and evoking Dasein? Heidegger apparently believes that the realization that “modern man” is fundamentally bored with existence causes people to thematize the difference between their existence and the concept of “man” as subjectivity. Boredom is precisely the gap between subject and world that makes “man” possible. Realizing this “fundamental attunement” of the present age leads us, he says, to want “to liberate the humanity in man, to liberate the humanity of man, i.e., the *essence* of man, to *let the Dasein in him become essential.*” He then elaborates on this demand for liberation as follows: “This demand has nothing to do with some human ideal in one or other domain of possible action. It is the *liberation of the Dasein in man* that is at issue here. At the same time this liberation is the task laid upon us to assume once more our very Dasein as an actual *burden.*” Dasein must learn to answer for itself, and philosophy plays a crucial role here by getting the Dasein to realize that it has to take on the burden of being free. Only if Dasein takes this burden on itself will it be able to do something concrete about its situation.
Even the philosopher has a mood, of course. But Heidegger attributes mood not simply to the philosopher, that is, the person doing the philosophizing, but to the philosophizing itself. People can be gripped by a fundamental attunement without recognizing it as such. The world-weariness of ennui and Weltschmerz were standard conditions at the end of the nineteenth century, and indeed, ennui may even have been a nineteenth-century French invention. Nevertheless, the activity of philosophizing would not be revelatory if it were not itself grounded in a basic attunement. “Philosophy,” he emphasizes, “in each case happens in a fundamental attunement.” Citing Novalis, Heidegger suggests that modern philosophizing represents a fundamental attunement of homesickness. This mood of homesickness reflects philosophy’s desire to be at home everywhere in the world, when it cannot be. Because people are not at home in the world at all any longer, the modern philosopher’s mood is melancholic. For Heidegger there is no creativity without melancholy. That is not to say, however, that melancholy is always creative.

What is this depressing, profound boredom about? Heidegger suggests ironically that what is boring is neither objects nor subjects, even if these seem to be the only two possibilities. What is profoundly boring is time. More precisely, temporality, or the time of Dasein, is what is boring. In boredom, Heidegger says, “one feels timeless, one feels removed from the flow of time.” But this is an oppressive feeling. Boredom is oppressive because time weighs heavily. Profound boredom is ontological, and it makes ontic boredom possible. Ontic boredom is boredom with a particular thing or situation (for instance, being bored by a long discussion of boredom). At the same time, the occurrence of ontic boredom points to ontological boredom. Ontological or profound boredom is emptiness, where everything withdraws. This withdrawal of everything makes Dasein aware of the whole of its existence.

Boredom is thus as ontologically revelatory of the whole of our life as anxiety (Angst) is in Being and Time. Neither is about any
particular thing, but each is about everything (and nothing). Neither of these, says Heidegger, is the *only way* to grasp the whole of one’s existence. Heidegger points toward this conclusion in his 1929 lecture, “What Is Metaphysics?” There too he distinguishes between ordinary boredom and genuine or profound boredom. Of the latter he writes, “Profound boredom, drifting here and there in the abysses of our existence like a muffling fog, removes all things and human beings and oneself along with them into a remarkable indifference. This boredom reveals beings as a whole.”65 Joy and awe are said to offer a comparable revelation. Boredom, anxiety, joy, and awe each represent different ways in which our Dasein is revealed to us.

On my interpretation, though, anxiety and boredom have different effects on our self-understanding. Anxiety is said to *individuate* Dasein by making Dasein confront its unique fate and destiny. Individuation is an encounter with what is meaningful about the world, and it still involves what Heidegger calls existential care. Rather than *individuate* Dasein, however, I read Heidegger as suggesting that profound boredom *subjectivizes* Dasein. To say that Angst individuates is to say that each Dasein finds out what it cares about, and what makes it “in each case its own.” To say that profound boredom subjectivizes is to maintain that the Dasein becomes indifferent to all meaningfulness and ceases to care about the world. Because of the degree of indifference to all meaningful interactions, the Dasein is left merely with its inner life. Heidegger says that the temporality that is profoundly boring “constitutes the ground of the possibility of the subjectivity of subjects, and indeed in such a way that the *essence of subjects* consists precisely in *having Dasein*, i.e., in always already enveloping beings as a whole in advance.”66 To be a subject is not to be an individual who is engaged in a determinate way in the world and who has an identity. The subject is an indeterminate “one” who is precisely not engaged with the world. Heidegger says that when we say that we are ourselves bored, we do not mean our individuated selves:
Yet we are now no longer speaking of *ourselves* being bored with . . . , but are saying: It is boring for one. It—for one—not for me as me, not for you as you, not for us as us, but *for one*. Name, standing, vocation, role, age and fate as mine and yours disappear. . . . This is what is decisive: that here we become an undifferentiated no one.67

In other words, one becomes a *subject*.

As I understand Heidegger, however, the contradiction at the core of profound boredom is that this indifference to everything is not complete. Dasein cares about this indifference and presumably it does not want to be bored to this extent. Dasein cannot settle for saying, “Nothing matters, so that does not matter either.”68 Simply shrugging one’s shoulders and muttering “whatever” will only aggravate the problem. Like Kierkegaard’s aesthete, profound boredom tries to exist as a contradiction by preoccupying itself with its inner life. This might be accomplished by what is currently called mindfulness, where one attempts to arrest the flow of time by focusing on the minutiae of each passing moment, trying to break it down into smaller and smaller parts in the attempt to hold onto it and to put off the inevitable moment when even that activity becomes boring.

Heidegger sums up the analysis of profound boredom to show that boredom is as ontologically basic as anxiety. Both can lead to an understanding of the whole of one’s life as a coherent unity in the moment of vision:

Boredom is the entrancement of the temporal horizon, an entrancement which lets the moment of vision belonging to temporality vanish. In thus letting it vanish, boredom impels entranced Dasein into the moment of vision as the properly authentic possibility of its existence, an existence only possible in the midst of beings as a whole, and within the horizon of entrancement, their telling refusal of themselves as a whole.69

In other words, boredom eliminates the entrancement with the everyday world that leads to the forgetting of Dasein as an originary singularity.70 But this vanishing leads Dasein to face up to its attunement and to take over explicitly the moment of vision for its
own sake. Because the question of the meaning of our own lives can arise only with the recognition of the possible impossibility or the potential disappearance of everything, boredom is another pathway to authenticity in addition to anxiety. So although temporality is what is boring, it generates the “legitimate illusion” that “things are boring, and that it is people themselves who are bored.”

Neither subject nor object, profound boredom makes possible the subjectivity of subjects. It shows that the essence of subjects consists in “having Dasein, i.e., always already enveloping beings as a whole in advance.”

Boredom and anxiety (and joy and awe) are thus moods that are revelatory of the whole of our being-in-the-world. Each of them also contributes to the temporality of Dasein in particular ways. At the end of the first division of Being and Time Heidegger has given a complete account of what it is to be a human being at a particular moment of time. In the second division, however, he wants to describe Dasein as a being whose life is “stretched out” in time between birth and death. His goal is to account for the “connectedness” of Dasein’s life. This is both an ontological and a normative task. As an ontological task he needs to describe how Dasein can be the same being at different times of life. As a normative task he wants to show how it is possible for Dasein to fail to connect its life, on the one hand, and to succeed in integrating the various moments in a cohesive manner, on the other. To fail to connect is to be inauthentic, that is, not one’s own, and to succeed in integrating one’s life cohesively is to be authentic, that is, one’s own.

Insofar as Dasein is always Mitsein or being-with-others, however, for the Dasein to be connected to itself, it must also be connected to its community. That is why it would be unsatisfactory if there were as many different times as there were individuals. Heidegger therefore owes us an explanation of the unity of time. As a provisional account, I would point out that as a member of a community and a generation, Dasein is initially constituted in a way that is “undifferentiated,” that is, neither authentic nor
inauthentic. Insofar as the Dasein is caught up in everydayness, for the most part it is inauthentic. Insofar as reckoning with time is necessary, the measuring of time can become a feature of our communal world. Clock time is thus a feature of the public, everyday world, and Heidegger claims that it is derivative from primordial temporality. Heidegger’s account of Angst explains how Dasein can become authentic through resolve based on recognition of one’s unavoidable finitude. It is important to realize that authenticity is not simply a function of the Dasein’s connectedness to its past. Authenticity also involves Dasein’s understanding of its present and its future. In fact, the past cannot be understood without understanding how it projects its future.

The future is the topic of chapter 4, where there is further discussion of the temporality of the distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic. At this point, we have Heidegger’s account of the source of temporality and of normativity at hand. This account of the distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic allows for a provisional answer to the question of what Heidegger means when he says Dasein is time. Heidegger can be read as saying that Dasein *interprets itself* as temporal. Does this mean that Dasein could interpret itself as atemporal? The answer is no, not if to interpret itself means that Dasein exists *as* its interpretation. But if Dasein can only interpret itself as temporal, is Heidegger’s claim vacuous? Again, the answer is no, because there are at least two possible ways in which Dasein can exist temporally, namely, authentically and inauthentically. Heidegger’s claim is thus not vacuous. On the contrary, it makes all the difference to our lives. How the normative is reflected in each of the temporal modes of past, present, and future can now be discussed in detail in the next chapters.

**Reflections**

To sum up the results of this chapter, let me review the various answers our philosophers have given to the question, what is the
source of time? From an initial reading of Kant’s first *Critique*, especially the Transcendental Aesthetic, it would be fair to conclude that his answer is that the source of time is the mind. As the form of intuition, it would seem that time is sufficiently mind dependent for us to be able to say that without mind there would be no time.

Heidegger’s reading of Kant in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* in 1929 specifies the source of time in Kant more precisely as the faculty of imagination. Through his analysis of the section of the A edition called the Schematism, Heidegger was able to see the transcendental imagination as the spontaneous welling up of the temporal. Heidegger then went on to attribute to Kant his own speculation, which was that the mind did not produce time so much as time produced the mind.

In the meantime, Heidegger’s mentor Husserl had lectured on internal time-consciousness between 1905 and 1910, and Heidegger had edited and published a version of these lectures in 1928. Although Kant offered an analysis of Newtonian, objective time, he did not have a specific theory of lived temporality. Husserl was the first to provide an account not so much of time as of time-consciousness. His introspective method of phenomenology led him to posit such time-consciousness as “inner.” Husserl’s contribution was intended to go beyond Kantian faculty psychology whereby time was imposed on the data of sensation by a faculty in the form of a synthesis that produced experience. Instead, he located duration in the experience of the moment by saying that each moment was not isolated, but connected both to the previous moments through retentions and to future moments through protentions. Once again, however, the source of temporality was taken to be internal and subjective.

Heidegger’s own account of temporality requires the source of temporality to be neither subjective nor objective. Instead, temporality is itself the source of the subjective–objective distinction. What does this mean? To put the point in a formulaic way, we could
say that in contrast to Kant’s view of time as mind dependent, Heidegger’s view is that it is the other way around, and mind is time dependent. In Heidegger’s terms, the statement that what temporalizes is temporality itself is intended to avoid reifying the mind into a present-at-hand object. Temporality has to do with the way that comportments occur. An important aspect of such behavior is attunement, which is reflected in moods, feelings, and emotions more than in explicit self-conscious cognitions. As we saw, the method that Heidegger uses to characterize moods such as boredom is called “awakening.” Unlike Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction, which brackets the reality of the subject and object to focus on consciousness per se, Heidegger believes that it is important to get down below the level of consciousness to the phenomena themselves. Making some aspects of our lives explicit tends to distort or destroy them. Heidegger calls this derivative way of bringing things to explicit consciousness “ascertaining.” I am suggesting that Heidegger sees Husserl’s phenomenological method as a form of ascertaining, in contrast to Heidegger’s own method of awakening.

Awakening reveals how the source of time is in temporality, and the source of temporality is nothing other than temporality itself. Heidegger’s elaborate example of such awakening is his discussion of boredom. Insofar as he was able to reduce the 150 pages of lectures to one published sentence in the essay “What Is Metaphysics?,” it would seem that the basic idea is not all that difficult. The point is that objective time is dependent on lived temporality and that the reverse is not the case. From that point of view, the way to describe temporality is not to reduce it to something else, but to see how it shows up in our implicit encounters with the world.

There are several other philosophically interesting issues or ideas that have come up in the course of this chapter that I would like to highlight. One of these is the contrast between explanations of temporality through faculty psychology and through accounts of duration. If Kant is the paradigm of the former, Husserl and, as we
will see, Bergson, are the quintessential theorists of the latter. Where to fit Heidegger into this distinction is not so clear. On the one hand, his notions of human existence as divided into three major aspects of comportment—Befindlichkeit (disposedness), Verstehen (understanding), and Rede (discourse)—bear a certain resemblance to faculty psychology. His analysis of temporality into the three ecstases of past, present, and future (discussed in later chapters), however, is more in the tradition of duration theory.

He was certainly aware of both Husserl and Bergson, as well as earlier philosophers of time from Aristotle and Augustine to Kant and Brentano. In general, then, as we encounter other philosophers of temporality in the following chapters, it may be productive to ask under which paradigm each of them figures. Then we can ask how they would solve the problem of explaining how time is one if temporality is relative to each individual. Is temporality so local that there are as many different times as there are people?

Another set of issues arose in this chapter around the idea of subjectivity, and they will need further investigation. For Heidegger the idea of subjectivity may be what Robert Brandom has dubbed a “Bad Idea,” one that should be dropped because of all the philosophical baggage that goes along with it. Or perhaps a more moderate approach would be to say that of course people have access to their own experiences, but that one should not try to build a philosophical method of phenomenological reduction around this minimalist claim. For Heidegger, under this construal, subjectivity would not be interesting to the philosopher, since it is a derivative and ontic mode, one that has some everyday use but no special philosophical significance. Insofar as it designates a derivative mode of experience, its emergence can be explained by more basic phenomena such as boredom or anxiety. In other words, subjectivity is to be explained; it does not do the explaining. More interesting will be ideas like the self and the individual, which are not identical to the idea of subjectivity. In relation to Heidegger,
for instance, one might well ask, if Dasein is not first and foremost a subject, what is it? What does “Dasein” refer to exactly?

Furthermore, there is a set of problems about the relation of subjectivity and self-consciousness. Michel Foucault, for instance, gives us a method for describing how subjects are formed by social practices before they are self-conscious of who they have become. Moreover, there is not simply one form of subjectivity exemplified by all subjects, but different subjectivities are formed under different “cultural politics.”

This reference to social practices and cultural politics raises issues about the possibility of phenomenology not simply describing experience, but also prescribing normativity. At this point we have one account of the birth of normativity, namely, Heidegger’s use of temporality to explain the distinction between authentic and inauthentic comportments. Later discussions will focus on the pertinence of this account of normativity to political and ethical attitudes toward the past and the future.