physics put forth thus far has long since been deprived of its reputation by the fact that it gave rise to undeniable, and in the dogmatic procedure indeed unavoidable, contradictions of reason with itself. A different treatment, completely opposite to the one used thus far, must be given to metaphysics—a science, indispensable to human reason, whose every new shoot\(^{255}\) can indeed be lopped off but whose root cannot be eradicated.\(^{256}\) We shall need more perseverance in order to keep from being deterred—either from within by the difficulty of this science or from without by people's resistance to it—from thus finally bringing it to a prosperous and fruitful growth.

**VII. IDEA AND DIVISION OF A SPECIAL SCIENCE UNDER THE NAME OF CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON\(^{257}\)**

From all of the above we arrive at the idea of a special science\(^{258}\) that may be called the *critique of pure reason*.\(^{259}\) For\(^{260}\) reason is the power that provides us with the *principles*\(^{261}\) of a priori cognition. Hence\(^{262}\) pure reason is that reason which contains the principles for cognizing something

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\(^{255}\)[*hervorgeschossenen Stamm.*]

\(^{256}\)[Although 'root' and 'eradicate' have the same origin, radix, and 'eradicate a root' may sound odd to an etymologically attuned ear, all of that applies to the respective German terms, *Wurzel* and *ausrotten*. Indeed, all four terms come from the same root!]

\(^{257}\)[The text of A continues, together with that of B, just below. The section number and heading were added in B.]

\(^{258}\)[Instead of the remainder of the sentence as given here from B, A has 'that may serve as [a] critique of pure reason'.]

\(^{259}\)[A adds, but B omits, the following two sentences:]

> Now, any cognition is called *pure* if it is not mixed with anything extraneous. Above all,\(^{a}\) however, a cognition is called absolutely pure if no experience or sensation whatsoever is mixed into it, so that the cognition is possible completely a priori.

\(^{a}\)[*besonders.*]

\(^{260}\)[A has 'Now. ']

\(^{261}\)[Emphasis added in B.]

\(^{262}\)[The inference relies on the two sentences from A that Kant just omitted in B, regarding them as understood.]
absolutely a priori. An organon\textsuperscript{263} of pure reason would be the sum of those principles by which all pure a priori cognitions can be acquired and actually brought about. Comprehensive application of such an organon would furnish us with a system of pure reason. Such a system, however, is a tall order; and it remains to be seen whether indeed an expansion of our cognition is possible here at all,\textsuperscript{264} and in what cases it is possible. Hence a science that merely judges pure reason, its sources, and its bounds may be regarded as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. Such a propaedeutic would have to be called not a doctrine but only a critique of pure reason.\textsuperscript{265} Its benefit, in regard to speculation,\textsuperscript{266} would actually only be negative. For such a critique would serve only to purify our reason, not to expand it, and would keep our reason free from errors, which is a very great gain already. I call transcendental all cognition that deals not so much with objects as rather with our way of cognizing objects in general insofar as that way of cognizing is to be possible a priori.\textsuperscript{267} A system of such concepts\textsuperscript{268} would be called transcendental philosophy. But, once again, this [system of] transcendental philosophy is too much for us as yet, here at the beginning.\textsuperscript{269} For since such a science would have to contain both analytic cognition and synthetic a priori cognition, in their completeness, it has too broad a range as far as our aim is concerned. For we need\textsuperscript{270} to carry the analysis only as far as it is indispensably necessary\textsuperscript{271} for gaining insight, in their entire range, into the principles of a priori synthesis, which is all that we are concerned with. What we are now dealing with is [not such a science, but only] this inquiry, which properly speaking can be called only a transcendental critique, not a doctrine. For its aim is not to expand the cognitions themselves, but only to correct them; and it is to serve as the touchstone of the value, or lack of value, of all a priori cognitions. Ac-

\textsuperscript{263}[Emphasis added in B.]

\textsuperscript{264}[A has 'whether indeed such an expansion of our cognition is possible at all.‘]

\textsuperscript{265}[Emphasis in 'propaedeutic,' 'doctrine,' and 'critique' added in B.]

\textsuperscript{266}[‘in regard to speculation’ added in B.]

\textsuperscript{267}[A has 'as rather with our a priori concepts of objects in general.’]

\textsuperscript{268}[I.e., a system of a priori concepts of objects in general; see the preceding note. Emphasis in 'system' and 'transcendental philosophy' added in B.]

\textsuperscript{269}[‘as yet’ added in B; ‘once again’ refers back to the point made earlier in this paragraph, that a system of pure reason is a tall order.]

\textsuperscript{270}[dürfen.]

\textsuperscript{271}[Instead of 'necessary' (notwendig), A has ‘needed’ (nötig) ]
cordingly, such a critique is a preparation: if possible, for an organon of those [cognitions]; or, should the [attempt to produce an] organon be un­successful, at least for a canon of them. Such a canon would, at any rate, some day allow us to exhibit, analytically as well as synthetically, the com­plete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether that system were to consist in expanding the cognition of pure reason or merely in setting boundaries for it. That such a system is possible—and, indeed, that it cannot be overly wide-ranging, so that we may hope to complete it entirely—can be gathered even in advance from the following: What here constitutes the object\textsuperscript{272} is not the nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but the understanding that makes judgments about the nature of things, and even this understanding, again, only in regard to its a priori cognition. Moreover, the understanding’s supply of a priori cognition cannot be hidden from us, because, after all, we need not search for it outside the understanding; and we may indeed suppose\textsuperscript{273} that supply to be small enough in order for us to record\textsuperscript{274} it completely, judge it for its value or lack of value, and make a correct assessment of it.\textsuperscript{275} [But my readers must not expect to find in this critique more than the mentioned preparation.] Still less must they expect here a critique of books and systems of pure reason, but should expect the critique of our power of pure reason itself.\textsuperscript{276} Only if we use that critique as our basis do we have a reliable touchstone for as­sessing the philosophical content of old and new works in this field. With­out such critique, unqualified historians and judges\textsuperscript{277} pass judgment on\textsuperscript{278} other people’s baseless assertions by means of their own, which are just as baseless.\textsuperscript{279}

Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science for which\textsuperscript{280} the cri­tique of pure reason is to outline the entire plan architectonically, i.e., from

\textsuperscript{272}[Of our inquiry.]
\textsuperscript{273}[\textit{allem Vermuten nach}.]
\textsuperscript{274}[\textit{aufnehmen}, as in an inventory.]
\textsuperscript{275}[Remainder of the paragraph added in B.]
\textsuperscript{276}[Cf. A xii.]
\textsuperscript{277}[\textit{Richter}.]
\textsuperscript{278}[\textit{beurteilen}]
\textsuperscript{279}[In A, what follows forms the second section of the introduction and is headed thus: II. The Division of Transcendental Philosophy.]
\textsuperscript{280}[A has ‘is, at this point [\textit{hier}], only the idea for which.’]
principles, with full guarantee of the completeness and reliability of all the components that make up this edifice. Transcendental philosophy is the system of all principles of pure reason.\(^{281}\) That this critique is not itself already called transcendental philosophy is due solely to this: in order for this critique to be a complete system, it would have to include a comprehensive analysis of the whole of human a priori cognition. Now, it is indeed true that our critique must also put before us a complete enumeration of all the root concepts\(^ {282}\) that make up that pure cognition. Yet the critique refrains, and properly so, from providing either the comprehensive analysis of these concepts themselves, or the complete review of the concepts derived from them. [There are two reasons for this.] First, this dissection of concepts would not serve our purpose; for it lacks that precariousness which we find in synthesis, [the precariousness] on account of which the whole critique is in fact there. Second, taking on the responsibility for the completeness of such an analysis and derivation (a responsibility from which we could, after all, have been exempted in view of our aim)\(^ {283}\) would go against the unity of our plan. On the other hand, this completeness in the dissection of the a priori concepts yet\(^ {284}\) to be supplied, as well as in the derivation [of other concepts] from them, can easily be added later: provided that first of all these [concepts] are there, as comprehensive principles of synthesis, and nothing is lacking\(^ {285}\) as regards this essential aim.\(^ {286}\)

Accordingly, the critique of pure reason [in a way] includes everything that makes up transcendental philosophy; it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy. But the critique is not yet that science itself, because it carries the analysis [of a priori concepts] only as far as is required for making a complete judgment about synthetic a priori cognition.

The foremost goal in dividing such a science is this: no concepts whatever containing anything empirical must enter into this science; or, differently put, the goal is that the a priori cognition in it be completely pure.\(^ {287}\)

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\(^{281}\) [This sentence added in B.]

\(^{282}\) [Stammbegriffe.]

\(^{283}\) [Parentheses added.]

\(^{284}\) [künftig.]

\(^{285}\) [A has 'lacking in them [ihnen].']

\(^{286}\) [Of supplying these concepts, as such principles.]

\(^{287}\) [For the distinction between 'a priori' and 'pure,' see B 3.]
Hence, although the supreme principles and basic concepts of morality\textsuperscript{288} are a priori cognitions, they still do not belong in transcendental philosophy. For they do of necessity also bring [empirical concepts] into the formulation of the system of pure morality:\textsuperscript{289} viz., the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, of desires and inclinations, etc., all of which are of empirical origin. Although the supreme principles and basic concepts of morality do not lay these empirical concepts themselves at the basis of their precepts, they must still bring in such pleasure and displeasure, desires and inclinations, etc. in [formulating] the concept of duty: viz., as an obstacle to be overcome, or as a stimulus that is not to be turned into a motive.\textsuperscript{290} Hence transcendental philosophy\textsuperscript{291} is a philosophy of merely speculative pure reason. For everything practical, insofar as it contains incentives,\textsuperscript{292} refers to feelings, and these belong to the empirical sources of cognition.

If, then, the division of the science being set forth here is to be performed in terms of the general viewpoint\textsuperscript{293} of a system as such, then this science must contain in the first place a \textit{doctrine of elements}, and in the second a \textit{doctrine of method}, of pure reason.\textsuperscript{294} Each of these two main parts would be subdivided; but the bases on which that subdivision would be made cannot yet be set forth here. Only this much seems to be needed here by way of introduction or advance notice: Human cognition has two stems, viz., \textit{sensibility} and \textit{understanding}, which perhaps spring from a common root, though one unknown to us. Through sensibility objects are given to us; through understanding they are thought.\textsuperscript{295} Now if sensibility were to contain a priori presentations\textsuperscript{296} constituting the condition\textsuperscript{297} un-

\textsuperscript{288}[\textit{Moralität} here, \textit{Sittlichkeit} just below.]

\textsuperscript{289}[Whereupon the system is \textit{no longer} pure, though it is still a priori.]

\textsuperscript{290}[Instead of 'For . . . turned into a motive,' A has 'For the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, of desires and inclinations, of the power of choice [\textit{Willkür}], etc., all of which are of empirical origin, would there [\textit{dabei}] have to be presupposed.']

\textsuperscript{291}[\textit{Philosophie} here, \textit{Weltweisheit} just below.]

\textsuperscript{292}[Instead of 'incentives' (\textit{Triebfedern}), A has 'motives' (\textit{Bewegungsgründe}, more commonly called \textit{Beweggründe}.]

\textsuperscript{293}[\textit{Gesichtspunkt}.]

\textsuperscript{294}[In A, 'doctrine of elements' and 'doctrine of method' are doubly emphasized (by bold print).]

\textsuperscript{295}[Emphasis in 'given' and 'thought' added in B.]

\textsuperscript{296}[\textit{Vorstellungen}. See B xvii br. n. 73.]

\textsuperscript{297}[A has 'conditions.']
der which objects are given to us, it would to that extent belong to tran-
scendental philosophy. And since the conditions under which alone the ob-
jects of human cognition are given to us precede the conditions under which
these objects are thought, the transcendental doctrine of sense\textsuperscript{298} would
have to belong to the \textit{first}\textsuperscript{299} part of the science of elements.

\textsuperscript{298}[I.e., in effect, of sensibility: \textit{Sinnenlehre}.]

\textsuperscript{299}[Emphasis added in B.]