TRANSCENDENTAL
DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS

PART I

TRANSCENDENTAL
AESTHETIC

§ 1

In whatever way and by whatever means a cognition may refer to objects, still intuition is that by which a cognition refers to objects directly, and at which all thought aims as a means. Intuition, however, takes

1[See B 35 n. 23. Cf. also Hans Vaihinger, op. cit. at A vii br. n. 5, vol. 2, 1–123; Norman Kemp Smith, op. cit. likewise at A vii br. n. 5, 79–166; and Herbert James Paton, op. cit. at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 1, 93–184.]

2[Numbering of subsections added in B.]

3[Erkenntnis. For the distinction between cognition and knowledge (Wissen), see A vii br. n. 6.]

4[Gegenstände, in this case. See A vii br. n. 7.]

5[Literally, 'the one by which' (where 'one' is in the feminine gender in the original): diejenige, wodurch. I am taking diejenige to refer forward to Anschauung, rather than backward to Art (the other feminine noun in this context), in which case we would have to read: 'still intuition is the way [in which and the means] by which.' (The bracketed insertion would be needed inasmuch as 'way by which' [Art, wodurch] does not make sense, whereas 'means by which' [Mittel, wodurch] does.)]

6[unmittelbar, see B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

7[abzweckt. Although Zweck means ('end' or) 'purpose,' abzwecken here is synonymous with abzielen ('aim'), in line with the etymology of Zweck (cf. English 'tack') as connected with a target (Ziel).]

8[I.e., as a means to such cognition.]
place only insofar as the object is given to us; but that, in turn, is possible only—for us human beings, at any rate\textsuperscript{9}—by the mind’s being affected in a certain manner. The capacity (a receptivity\textsuperscript{10}) to acquire presentations\textsuperscript{11} as a result of\textsuperscript{12} the way in which we are affected\textsuperscript{13} by objects is called sensibility. Hence by means of sensibility objects are given to us, and it alone supplies us with intuitions. Through understanding, on the other hand, objects are thought, and from it arise concepts. But all thought must, by means of certain characteristics,\textsuperscript{14} refer ultimately to intuitions, whether it does so straightforwardly (directe) or circuitously (indirekte);\textsuperscript{15} and hence it must, in us [human beings], refer ultimately to sensibility, because no object can be given to us in any other manner than through sensibility.

The effect of an object on our capacity for presentation, insofar as we are affected by the object, is sensation. Intuition that refers to the object

\textsuperscript{9}[This qualification added in B. The point is that other beings might have an intuition that is intellectual (and as such spontaneous, self-active) rather than sensible (and hence passive, a mere receptivity): see B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

\textsuperscript{10}[I have inserted ‘a’ before ‘receptivity’ in order to make clear that Kant is not equating receptivity with capacity. He rather uses the term ‘capacity’ synonymously with ‘power’: see A 51/B 75, and cf. the \textit{Critique of Judgment}, Ak. V, 177.]

\textsuperscript{11}[\textit{Vorstellungen}. My reason for translating \textit{Vorstellung} as ‘presentation’ rather than as ‘representation’ is given at B xvii br. n. 73.]

\textsuperscript{12}[\textit{durch}.]

\textsuperscript{13}[In his working copy of edition A, Kant adds this handwritten note: ‘unless intrinsically \textit{[an sich]} the presentation \textit{[Vorstellung]} is itself the cause of the object.’ See \textit{Nachträge zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Supplementary Entries to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason)}, ed. Benno Erdmann (Kiel: Lipsius & Tischer, 1881), xi. Gerhard Lehmann, in his own edition of the \textit{Nachträge}, indicates that Kant’s note is added to the word ‘affected’: “Nachträge zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft” (“Supplementary Entries to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason”), in the Akademie edition’s \textit{Vorarbeiten und Nachträge (Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries)}, part of the Nachlaß (Posthumous Writings), Ak. XXIII, 44. The note seems to go with the qualification, added in B, ‘for us human beings, at any rate,’ and thus suggests a contrast with how “objects” would be “given” in the case of a being with an intuitive (rather than discursive, i.e., conceptual) understanding, i.e., with an understanding whose presentations would be intellectual (rather than sensible) intuitions. See B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

\textsuperscript{14}[This insertion added in B. Kant’s word for ‘characteristic’ (which in some contexts I also render as ‘mark’) is \textit{Merkmal}. A characteristic is a partial presentation insofar as it is considered as cognitive basis (or ground) of the whole presentation. See the \textit{Logic}, Ak. IX, 58. See also J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 145.]

\textsuperscript{15}[\textit{geradezu oder im Umschweife}; the Latin terms mean ‘directly,’ ‘indirectly.’ Cf \textit{On the Progress of Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff}, Ak. XX, 279–80.]
through sensation is called *empirical* intuition. The undetermined\textsuperscript{16} object\textsuperscript{17} of an empirical intuition is called *appearance*.

Whatever in an appearance corresponds to sensation I call its *matter*; but whatever in an appearance brings about the fact that the manifold of the appearance\textsuperscript{18} can be ordered in certain relations\textsuperscript{19} I call the *form* of appearance. Now, that in which alone sensations can be ordered and put\textsuperscript{20} into a certain form cannot itself be sensation again. Therefore, although the matter of all appearance is given to us only a posteriori, the form of all appearance must altogether lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind; and hence that form must be capable of being examined apart from all sensation.

All presentations in which nothing is found that belongs to sensation I call *pure* (in the transcendental sense of the term). Accordingly, the pure form of sensible intuitions generally, in which everything manifold in experience is intuited in certain relations, will be found in the mind a priori. This pure form of sensibility will also itself be called *pure intuition*. Thus, if from the presentation of a body I separate what the understanding thinks in it, such as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and if I similarly separate from it what belongs to sensation in it, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., I am still left with something from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which, even if there is no actual object of the senses or of sensation,\textsuperscript{21} has its place in the mind a priori, as a mere form of sensibility.

There must, therefore, be a science of all principles of a priori sensibility;\textsuperscript{22} I call such a science *transcendental aesthetic*.\textsuperscript{23} It constitutes the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, and stands in contrast to

\textsuperscript{16}[Or 'indeterminate': *unbestimmt*. Kant is here giving his less frequently used characterization of an appearance. He usually treats appearances as objects of *experience* and thus as determined (determinate), viz., by the forms of thought (categories), by the forms of intuition (space and time), and by the matter of intuition as contributed by sensation.]

\textsuperscript{17}[Gegenstand; likewise earlier in this and the preceding paragraphs.]

\textsuperscript{18}[On 'manifold,' see B 203 br. n. 38.]

\textsuperscript{19}[A has 'brings about the fact that the manifold of the appearance is intuited as ordered in certain relations.]

\textsuperscript{20}[stellen.]

\textsuperscript{21}[der Sinne oder Empfindung.]

that [part of the] transcendental doctrine of elements which contains the
principles of pure thought and is called transcendental logic.

Hence in the transcendental aesthetic we shall, first of all, isolate sensi-
bility, by separating from it everything that the understanding through its
concepts thinks [in connection] with it, so that nothing other than empiri-
cal intuition will remain. Second, we shall also segregate from sensibil-
ity everything that belongs to sensation, so that nothing will remain but

23The Germans are the only people who have come to use the word aesthetic[s] to
designate what others call the critique of taste. They are doing so on the basis of a
false hope conceived by that superb analyst, Baumgarten: he hoped to bring our
critical judging of the beautiful under rational principles, and to raise the rules for
such judging to the level of a science. Yet that endeavor is futile. For, as regards
their principal sources, those rules or criteria are merely empirical. Hence they can
never serve as determinate a priori laws to which our judgment of taste would have
to conform; it is, rather, our judgment of taste which constitutes the proper touch-
stone for the correctness of those rules or criteria. Because of this it is advisable to
follow either of two alternatives. One of these is to let this new name aesthetic[s]
become extinct again, and to reserve the name aesthetic for the doctrine that is
ture science. (In doing so we would also come closer to the language of the an-
cients and its meaning: among the ancients the division of cognition into αἰσθητά καὶ νοετά[was quite famous. The other alternative would be for the new aesthet-
c[s] to share the name with speculative philosophy; we would then take the
name partly in its transcendental sense, and partly in the psychological meaning.

24[I.e., everything conceptual supplied by the understanding is to be taken away so that one
is left with nothing more than what belongs to intuition This in turn is then to be separated
into what belongs to sensation (as included in empirical intuition), on the one hand, and pure
intuition, on the other.]
pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which is all that sensibility can supply a priori. In the course of that inquiry it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition, which are principles for a priori cognition: viz., space and time. We now proceed to the task of examining these.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{25}[als.]}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{26}[See Gottfried Martin, }\textit{Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1955), 11–41 ]\]
Section I
Space

§ 2
METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION OF THIS CONCEPT

By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we present objects as outside us, and present them one and all in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another are determined or determinable. By


28[The metaphysical exposition investigates the nature of the presentation of space and shows that this presentation is given a priori. The transcendental exposition of space (in § 3) shows that and how from the a priori presentation of space something else that is a priori follows—viz., synthetic a priori cognitions (propositions of geometry). Cf. the Prolegomena, Ak. IV, 263–64, 284–85; also below, A 86–88 and B 133–34.]

29[Number and heading of subsection added in B.]
means of inner sense the mind intuits itself, or its inner state. Although inner sense provides no intuition of the soul itself as an object, yet there is a determinate form under which alone [as condition] we can intuit the soul's inner state. [That form is time.] Thus everything belonging to our inner determinations\textsuperscript{30} is presented in relations of time. Time cannot be intuited outwardly, any more than space can be intuited as something within us. What, then, are space and time? Are they actual beings? Are they only determinations of things, or, for that matter, relations among them? If so, are they at least\textsuperscript{31} determinations or relations that would belong to things intrinsically also, i.e., even if these things were not intuited? Or are they determinations and relations that adhere only to the form of intuition and hence to the subjective character of our mind, so that apart from that character these predicates cannot be ascribed to anything at all? In order to inform ourselves on these points, let us first of all give an exposition of the concept of space.\textsuperscript{32} Now, by exposition\textsuperscript{33} (expositio) I mean clear (even if not comprehensive) presentation of what belongs to a concept; and such exposition is metaphysical if it contains what exhibits the concept as given a priori.

1. Space is not an empirical concept that has been abstracted from outer experiences. For the presentation of space must already lie at the basis\textsuperscript{34} in order for certain sensations to be referred to something outside me (i.e., referred to something in a location of space other than the location in which I am). And it must similarly already lie at the basis in order for me to be able to present [the objects of] these sensations as outside and alongside\textsuperscript{35} one another, and hence to present them not only as different but as being in different locations. Accordingly, the presentation of space cannot be one that we take from the relations of outer appearance by means of experience; rather, only through the presentation of space is that outer experience possible in the first place.

\textsuperscript{30}[Bestimmungen. The term usually means, roughly, 'attribute'; yet in this work it is important to keep visible the term's connection with 'determine,' 'determinate,' etc.]

\textsuperscript{31}[doch.]

\textsuperscript{32}[A has 'let us first of all examine space.' Also, remainder of paragraph added in B.]

\textsuperscript{33}[Erörterung.]

\textsuperscript{34}[zum Grunde liegen.]

\textsuperscript{35}[‘and alongside’ added in B.]
2. Space is a necessary a priori presentation that underlies all outer intuitions. We can never have a presentation of there being no space, even though we are quite able to think of there being no objects encountered in it. Hence space must be regarded as the condition for the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent on them. Space is an a priori presentation that necessarily underlies outer appearances.

3. Space is not a discursive or, as we say, universal concept of things as such; rather, it is a pure intuition. For, first, we can present only one space; and when we speak of many spaces, we mean by that only parts of one and the same unique space. Nor, second, can these parts precede the one all-encompassing space, as its constituents, as it were (from which it can be assembled); rather, they can be thought only as in it. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and hence also the universal concept of spaces as such, rests solely on [our bringing in] limitations. It follows from this that, as far as space is concerned, an a priori intuition of it (i.e., one that is not empirical) underlies all concepts of space. By the same to-

36[zum Grunde liegt.]
37[A here inserts the following paragraph:] 3. On this a priori necessity rests the apodeictic certainty of all geometric principles and the possibility of geometry's constructions. For if this presentation of space were a concept acquired a posteriori, drawn from general outer experience, then the first principles for determining [things] in mathematics would be nothing but perceptions. Hence they would have all the contingency that perception has; and it would then precisely not be necessary for there to be only one straight line between two points, but this would be something that experience always teaches us. By the same token, what we take from experience has only comparative universality, viz., through induction. Hence all we could say is: as far as we have been able to tell until now, no space has been found that has more than three dimensions.

38[ihre.]
39[allgemeine. This concept is "universal" in the same sense in which the principles of geometry are. Cf. below, A 47/B 64.]
40[Einschränkungen.]
ken, no geometric principles—e.g., the principle\textsuperscript{41} that in a triangle two sides together are greater than the third—are ever derived from universal concepts of line and triangle;\textsuperscript{42} rather, they are all derived from intuition, and are derived from it moreover a priori, with apodeictic certainty.

4.\textsuperscript{43} We present space as an infinite given magnitude. Now it is true that every concept must be thought as a presentation that is contained in an infinite multitude of different possible presentations (as their common characteristic\textsuperscript{44}) and hence the concept contains these presentations under itself. But no concept, as such, can be thought as\textsuperscript{45} containing an infinite multitude of presentations within itself:\textsuperscript{46} Yet that is how we think space (for all parts of space, \textit{ad infinitum}, are simultaneous\textsuperscript{47}). Therefore the original presentation of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{41}[\textit{Grundsatz}.]
\textsuperscript{42}[Emphasis in both terms added.]
\textsuperscript{43}[In the place of this paragraph, A has the following:]
5. We present space as given as an infinite magnitude. A universal concept of space (which is shared by a foot as it is by an ell) cannot determine anything as regards magnitude. If the boundlessness in the progression of intuition did not carry with it a principle\textsuperscript{a} of the infinity of intuition, no concept of relations would do so.\textsuperscript{b}

\textsuperscript{a}[\textit{principium}.]
\textsuperscript{b}[I.e., carry with it a principle of space as an infinite magnitude.]

\textsuperscript{44}[See A 19/B 33 br. n. 14.]
\textsuperscript{45}[‘as if,’ literally.]
\textsuperscript{46}[See J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xlii br. n. 149, 143–45.]
\textsuperscript{47}[zugleich.]
\textsuperscript{48}[But, as Kant has indicated, from this original intuition of space concepts can be formed, including such concepts as those of empirical space, relative space, Euclidean space, mathematical space. Cf., for example, the \textit{Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science}, Ak. IV, 481–82, where Kant talks about empirical space and absolute space.]
PART I TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

§ 3

TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION\(^{50}\) OF THE CONCEPT OF SPACE

By a *transcendental exposition* I mean the explication of a concept as a principle that permits insight into the possibility of other synthetic a priori cognitions. Such explication requires (1) that cognitions of that sort do actually flow from the given concept, and (2) that these cognitions are possible only on the presupposition of a given way of explicating that concept.

Geometry is a science that determines the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori. What, then, must the presentation of space be in order for such cognition of space to be possible? Space must originally be *intuition*. For from a mere concept one cannot obtain propositions that go beyond the concept; but we do obtain such propositions in geometry (Introduction, V\(^{51}\)). This intuition must, however, be encountered in us a priori, i.e., prior\(^{52}\) to any perception of an object; hence this intuition must be pure rather than empirical. For geometric propositions are one and all apodictic, i.e., linked with the consciousness of their necessity—e.g., the proposition that space has only three dimensions. But propositions of that sort cannot be empirical judgments or judgments of experience;\(^{53}\) nor can they be inferred from such judgments (Introduction, II\(^{54}\)).

How, then, can the mind have an outer intuition which precedes the objects themselves, and in which the concept of these objects can be determined a priori? Obviously, this can be so only insofar as this intuition resides merely in the subject, as the subject's formal character of being affected by objects and of thereby acquiring from them *direct presentation*, i.e., *intuition*, and hence only as form of outer *sense* in general.

Our explication of the concept of space is, therefore, the only one that makes comprehensible the *possibility of geometry* as a [kind of] synthetic a priori cognition. Any way of explicating the concept that fails to make

\(^{49}\) [The following passage, to the end of B 41, added in B.]

\(^{50}\) [Cf. above, A 22/B 37 br. n. 28.]

\(^{51}\) [B 14–18, specifically 16.]

\(^{52}\) [Vor, which means 'before' only when used temporally, unlike here.]

\(^{53}\) [See B 11 br n. 201.]

\(^{54}\) [B 3–6.]
this possibility comprehensible, even if it should otherwise seem to have some similarity to ours, can be distinguished from it most safely by these criteria.\[55\]

**CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABOVE CONCEPTS**

(a) Space represents\[56\] no property whatever of any things in themselves, nor does it represent things in themselves in their relation to one another.\[57\] That is, space represents no determination of such things, no determination that adheres to objects themselves and that would remain even if we abstracted from all subjective conditions of intuition. For determinations, whether absolute or relative, cannot be intuited prior\[58\] to the existence of the things to which they belong, and hence cannot be intuited a priori.

(b) Space is nothing but the mere form of all appearances of outer senses; i.e., it is the subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer intuition is possible for us. Now, the subject's receptivity for being affected by objects\[59\] precedes necessarily all intuitions of these objects. Thus we can understand how the form of all appearances can be given in the mind prior to all actual perceptions, and hence given a priori; and we can understand how this form, as a pure intension in which all objects must be determined, can contain, prior to all experience, principles for the relations among these objects.

Only from the human standpoint, therefore, can we speak of space, of extended beings, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can—viz, as far as we may be affected by objects—acquire outer intuition, then the presentation of space means nothing whatsoever. This predicate is ascribed to things only insofar as they appear to us, i.e., only insofar as they are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity which we call sensibility is a necessary condition of all relations in which objects are intuited as outside us; and if we abstract from these

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\[55\] The criteria numbered (1) and (2) at the beginning of this subsection.

\[56\] *vorstellen*, clearly not in the sense of the mental activity of *presenting* discussed at B xvii br. n. 73.

\[57\] As Leibniz claimed when he said that space involves nothing but the relations among the monads (things in themselves).

\[58\] *vor*.

\[59\] *Gegenstände* here, *Objekte* just below.
objects, then the form of that receptivity is a pure intuition that bears the name of space. We cannot make the special conditions of sensibility to be conditions of the possibility of things, but only of the possibility of their appearances. Hence we can indeed say that space encompasses all things that appear to us externally, but not that it encompasses all things in themselves, intuited or not, or intuited by whatever subject. For we can make no judgment at all about the intuitions of other thinking beings, as to whether they are tied to the same conditions that limit our intuition and that are valid for us universally. If the limitation on a judgment is added to the concept of the subject [term], then the judgment holds unconditionally. The proposition, All things are side by side in space, holds under the limitation: if these things are taken as objects of our sensible intuition. If I here add the condition to the concept and say, All things considered as outer appearances are side by side in space, then this rule holds universally and without limitation. Accordingly, our exposition teaches that space is real (i.e., objectively valid) in regard to everything that we can encounter externally as object, but teaches at the same time that space is ideal in regard to things when reason considers them in themselves, i.e., without taking into account the character of our sensibility. Hence we assert that space is empirically real (as regards all possible outer experience), despite asserting that space is transcendentally ideal, i.e., that it is nothing as soon as we omit [that space is] the condition of the possibility of all experience and suppose space to be something underlying things in themselves.

Besides space, on the other hand, no other subjective presentation that is referred to something external could be called an a priori objective presentation. For from none of them can we derive synthetic a priori propo-
sitions, as we can from intuition in space (§ 3\textsuperscript{66}). Hence, strictly speaking, ideality does not apply to them, even though they agree with the presentation of space inasmuch as they belong merely to the subjective character of the kind of sense involved. They may belong, e.g., to the sense\textsuperscript{67} of sight, of hearing, or of touch,\textsuperscript{68} by [being] sensations\textsuperscript{69} of colors, sounds, or heat. Yet because they are mere sensations rather than intuitions, they do not allow us to cognize any object at all, let alone a priori.

The only aim of this comment is to forestall an error: it might occur to someone to illustrate the ideality of space asserted above by means of examples such as colors or taste, etc. These are thoroughly insufficient for

sidered as appearance, but belongs to the special character\textsuperscript{a} of the sense in the subject who is enjoying this taste.\textsuperscript{b} Colors are not properties\textsuperscript{c} of the bodies to the intuition of which they attach, but are only modifications of the sense of sight, which is affected in a certain manner by light. Space, on the other hand, as condition of external objects, belongs necessarily to their appearance or intuition. Taste and colors are in no way necessary conditions under which alone objects\textsuperscript{d} can become objects of the senses for us. They are linked with the appearance only as contingently added effects of the special\textsuperscript{e} character of our organs.\textsuperscript{f} That is, moreover, why they are not a priori presentations, but are based on sensation—[a thing's] good taste, indeed, being based even on feeling\textsuperscript{g} (the feeling of pleasure and displeasure), as an effect of sensation. Nor can anyone have a priori a presentation either of a color or of any taste. Space, on the other hand, concerns only the pure form of intuition and hence includes no sensation whatever (nothing empirical); and all kinds and determinations of space are capable of being presented a priori—indeed, they must be capable of this if concepts of shapes and of [spatial] relations are to arise. Through space alone is it possible for things to be external objects for us.

\textsuperscript{a}[Beschaffenheit.]
\textsuperscript{b}[Or 'that wine. ']
\textsuperscript{c}[Beschaffenheiten.]
\textsuperscript{d}[Gegenstände here, Objekte just below.]
\textsuperscript{e}[Or 'particular': besonder.]
\textsuperscript{f}[Organisation.]
\textsuperscript{g}[Gefühl. Cf. br. n. 68, just below.]

\textsuperscript{66}[First part of the subsection, B 40–41.]
\textsuperscript{67}[Sinn.]
\textsuperscript{68}[Gefühl, the basic meaning of which is 'feeling' Cf. A 29 (see B 44 n. 65) incl. br. n. 65c.]
\textsuperscript{69}[Empfindungen.]
this, because they are rightly regarded not as properties of things, but merely as changes in ourselves as subjects, changes that may even be different in different people. For in this case, something that originally is itself only appearance—e.g., a rose—counts as a thing in itself in the empirical meaning of this expression, a thing in itself that in regard to color can nonetheless appear differently to every eye. The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the other hand, is a critical reminder. It reminds us that nothing whatever that is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form of things, one that might belong to them as they are in themselves. Rather, what we call external objects are nothing but mere presentations of our sensibility. The form of this sensibility is space; but its true correlate, i.e., the thing in itself, is not cognized at all through these presentations, and cannot be. Nor, on the other hand, is the thing in itself ever at issue in experience.

70[‘as changes of our subject,’ Kant says literally.]
71[gelten.]
72[Cf. A 45/B 62, also B 69 incl. br. n. 175.]
73[Sache here, Ding two sentences earlier and again (in the plural) hereafter.]
74[gefragt]
Section II
Time

§ 4
METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION
OF THE
CONCEPT OF TIME

1. Time is not an empirical concept that has been abstracted from any experience. For simultaneity or succession would not even enter our perception if the presentation of time did not underlie them a priori. Only on the presupposition of this presentation can we present this and that as being at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (sequentially).

75[Cf. Hans Vaihinger, op. cit. at A vii br. n. 5, vol. 2, 368–441. Cf. also Arthur Melnick, op. cit. at A 22/B 37 br. n. 27, 20–26. For references to Paton, see above, B 1 br. n. 152; for references to Kemp Smith, see above, A vii br. n. 5.]

76[Cf. A 22/B 37 br. n. 28.]

77[Number and heading of subsection added in B.]

78[Zugleichsein. See B 257 br. n. 209.]

79[einiges.]
2. Time is a necessary presentation that underlies all intuitions. As regards appearances in general, we cannot annul time itself, though we can quite readily remove appearances from time. Hence time is given a priori. All actuality of appearances is possible only in time. Appearances, one and all, may go away; but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be annulled.

3. This a priori necessity, moreover, is the basis for the possibility of apodeictic principles about relations of time, or for the possibility of axioms about time in general. Time has only one dimension; different times are not simultaneous but sequential (just as different spaces are not sequential but simultaneous\(^{80}\)). These principles cannot be obtained from experience. For experience would provide neither strict universality nor apodeictic certainty; we could say only that common perception teaches us that it is so, but not that it must be so. These principles hold as rules under which alone experiences are possible at all; and they instruct us prior to experience, not through it.

4. Time is not a discursive or, as it is called, universal concept; rather, it is a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are only parts of one and the same time; and the kind of presentation that can be given only through a single object is intuition. Moreover, the proposition that different times cannot be simultaneous could not be derived from a universal concept. The proposition is synthetic, and [therefore] cannot arise from concepts alone. Hence it is contained directly in the intuition and presentation of time.

5. To say that time is infinite means nothing more than that any determinate magnitude of time is possible only through limitations [put] on a single underlying time. Hence the original presentation \textit{time}\(^{81}\) must be given as unlimited. But if something is such that its parts themselves and any magnitude of an object in it can be presented determinately only through limitation, then the whole presentation of it cannot be given through concepts (for they contain only partial presentations\(^{82}\)), but any such presentation\(^{83}\) must be based on direct intuition.

\(^{80}\)\text{[Cf. the end of § 2, B 40.]}\]
\(^{81}\)\text{[Emphasis added in B.]}\]
\(^{82}\)\text{[A has 'for in their case the partial presentations precede.' Cf. the end of § 2, B 40. See also J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 145.]}\]
\(^{83}\)\text{[ihnen A has \textit{ihre} instead, so that this last clause reads: 'but [any such presentation] must be based on its direct intuition.']\]
§ 5

TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION OF THE CONCEPT OF TIME

I may refer for this exposition to No. 3, where, for the sake of brevity, I put among the items of the metaphysical exposition what in fact is transcendental. Let me add here that the concept of change, and with it the concept of motion (as change of place), is possible only through and in the presentation of time; and that if this presentation were not (inner) a priori intuition, no concept whatsoever could make comprehensible the possibility of a change, i.e., of a combination, in one and the same object, of contradictorily opposed predicates (e.g., one and the same thing's being in a place and not being in that same place). Only in time can both of two contradictorily opposed determinations be met with in one thing: viz., sequentially. Hence our concept of time explains the possibility of all that synthetic a priori cognition which is set forth by the—quite fertile—general theory of motion.

§ 6

CONCLUSIONS FROM THESE CONCEPTS

(a) Time is not something that is self-subsistent or that attaches to things as an objective determination, and that hence would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of our intuition of it. For if time were self-subsistent, then it would be something that without there being an actual object would yet be actual. But if, on the second alternative, time were a determination or order attaching to things themselves, then it could not precede the objects as their condition, and could not a priori be cognized through synthetic propositions and intuited. But this a priori cogni-

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84 [This whole subsection added in B.]
85 [Cf. A 22/B 37 br. n. 28.]
86 [In § 4, A 31/B 47.]
87 [§ 6' added in B]
88 [für sich selbst bestehen.]
89 [As in the case of Newton's absolute space.]
90 [As in the case of Leibniz, who held that time involves nothing but relations among the monads (things in themselves).]
tion and intuition can take place quite readily if time is nothing but the subjective condition under which alone any intuition can take place in us. For in that case this form of inner intuition can be presented prior\(^{91}\) to the objects, and hence presented a priori.

(b) Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuiting we do of ourselves and of our inner state. For time cannot be a determination of outer appearances, [because] it does not belong to any shape or position, etc., but rather determines the relation of presentations in our inner state. And precisely because this inner intuition gives us no shape, do we try to make up for this deficiency by means of analogies. We present time sequence by a line progressing \textit{ad infinitum}, a line in which the manifold constitutes a series of only one dimension. And from the properties of that line we infer all the properties of time, except for the one difference that the parts of the line are simultaneous whereas the parts of time are always sequential. This fact, moreover, that all relations of time can be expressed by means of outer\(^{92}\) intuition, shows that the presentation of time is itself intuition.

(c) Time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances generally. Space is the pure form of all outer appearances; as such it is limited, as a priori condition, to just outer appearances. But all presentations, whether or not they have outer things as their objects, do yet in themselves, as determinations of the mind, belong\(^{93}\) to our inner state; and this inner state is subject to\(^{94}\) the formal condition of inner intuition, and hence to the condition of time. Therefore time is an a priori condition of all appearance generally: it is the direct\(^{95}\) condition of inner appearances (of our souls), and precisely thereby also, indirectly, a condition of outer appearances. If I can say a priori that all outer appearances are in space and are determined a priori according to spatial relations, then the principle of inner sense allows me to say, quite universally, that all appearances generally, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time and stand necessarily in relations of time.

\(^{91}\) [\textit{vor}]

\(^{92}\) [\textit{an einer äußeren}]

\(^{93}\) [\textit{gehören}]

\(^{94}\) [\textit{gehören unter}]

\(^{95}\) [\textit{unmittelbar} (analogously for 'indirectly' just below) See B xxxix br. n. 144c]
If we take objects as they may be in themselves—i.e., if we abstract from the way in which we intuit ourselves inwardly, and in which by means of this intuition we also take into our power of presentation all outer intuitions—then time is nothing. Time has objective validity only with regard to appearances, because these are already things considered as objects of our senses. But time is no longer objective if we abstract from the sensibility of our intuition, and hence from the way of presenting peculiar to us, and speak of things as such. Hence time is merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (an intuition that is always sensible—i.e., inasmuch as we are affected by objects); in itself, i.e., apart from the subject, time is nothing. Nevertheless, time is necessarily objective in regard to all appearances, and hence also in regard to all things that we can encounter in experience. We cannot say that all things [as such] are in time; for in the concept of things as such we abstract from all ways of intuiting them, while yet this intuition is the very condition under which time belongs in the presentation of objects. If now we add the condition to the concept, and say that all things as appearances (objects of sensible intuition) are in time, then this principle has all its objective correctness and a priori universality.

Hence the doctrine we are asserting is that time is empirically real, i.e., objectively valid in regard to all objects that might ever be given to our senses. And since our intuition is always sensible, no object that is not subject to the condition of time can ever be given to us in experience. On the other hand, we dispute that time has any claim to absolute reality; i.e., we dispute any claim whereby time would, quite without taking into account the form of our sensible intuition, attach to things absolutely, as a

96[nehmen.]
97[More literally, 'encompass in': in . . . befassen.]
98[annehmen.]
99[Or 'things in general': Dinge überhaupt. My reason for (usually) rendering überhaupt in this way is given at B xxvii br. n. 106.]
100[Reading diese for the dieser found in B as B appears in the Akademie edition.]
101[eigentliche.]
102[As added to the concept of a thing as such.]
103[absolute.]
104[auch.]
105[schlechthin.]
condition or property. Nor indeed can such properties, properties belonging to things in themselves, ever be given to us through the senses. In this, then, consists the transcendental ideality of time. According to this view, if we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, then time is nothing, and cannot be included among objects in themselves (apart from their relation to our intuition) either as subsisting [as such an object] or as inhering [in one]. But this ideality of time is not to be compared, any more than is the ideality of space, with the subreptions of sensations.

For in their case we presuppose that the appearance itself in which these predicates [allegedly] inhere has objective reality. In the case of time, such objective reality is entirely absent, except insofar as this reality is merely empirical, i.e., except insofar as we regard the object itself as merely appearance. See, on this, the above comment, in SECTION I.

§ 7
ELUCIDATION

Against this theory, which grants that time is empirically real but disputes that it is real absolutely and transcendently, I have heard men of insight raise quite unanimously an objection. I gather from this great unanimity that the objection must occur naturally to every reader who is not accustomed to contemplations such as these. The objection is the following. Changes are actual. (This is proved by the variation on the part of our own presentations—even if one were to deny all outer appearances,

106[The transcendental idealism of time, properly speaking.]
107[subsistierend.]
108[I.e., (instances of) their surreptitious substitution for, and thus confusion with, something in the object, as discussed above: A 28-30/B 44-45. See also A 643 = B 671 incl. br. n. 14, and cf. A 791–92 = B 819–20.]
109[I.e., the colors, sounds, etc., surreptitiously treated as properties of the object.]
110[Whereas the colors, sounds, etc., do not.]
111[And is here treated as such, subreption thus being precluded.]
112[See the end of the section on space. A 28–30/B 44–45.]
113[§ 7' added in B]
114[Veränderungen.]
115[Wechsel. On variation and change, see B 224 br n. 45, and cf. A 187/B 230.]
along with their changes.) Now changes are possible only in time. Therefore time is something actual. There is no difficulty in replying to the objection. I concede the whole argument. Time is indeed something actual, viz., the actual form of inner intuition. It therefore has subjective reality in regard to inner experience; i.e., I actually have the presentation of time and of my determinations in time. Hence time is to be regarded as actual, though not as an object but as the way of presenting that I myself have as an object. Suppose, on the other hand, that I could intuit myself without being subject to this condition of sensibility, or that another being could so intuit me; in that case the very same determinations that we now present as changes would provide a cognition in which the presentation of time, and hence also that of change, would not occur at all. Hence time retains its empirical reality as condition of all our experiences. Only absolute reality must, by the reasons adduced above, be denied to time. Time is nothing but the form of our inner intuition. If we take away from time [the qualification that it is] the special condition of our sensibility, then the concept of time vanishes as well; time attaches not to objects themselves, but merely to the subject intuiting them.

But what causes this objection to be raised so unanimously, and raised, moreover, by those who nonetheless cannot think of any plausible objection against the doctrine that space is ideal, is the following. They had no hope of establishing apodeictically that space is real absolutely; for they are confronted by idealism, according to which the actuality of external objects is incapable of strict proof. By contrast, the actuality of the object of our inner sense (the actuality of myself and of my state) is directly evident through consciousness. External objects might be a mere illusion; but the object of inner sense is, in their opinion, undeniably something actual. They failed to bear in mind, however, that both of them, though their actuality as presentations is indisputable, still belong only to appearance. Appearance always has two sides. One is the side where the object is regarded in itself (without regard to the way in which it is intuited, which is

116[Construing wirklich as an adjective, rather than as an adverb modifying 'to be regarded'.] 

117I can indeed say: My presentations follow one another. But that means only that we are conscious of them as being in a time sequence—in accordance, i.e., with the form of inner sense. Time is not, on that account, something in itself, nor is it a determination attaching to things objectively. 

*a [folgen.]

*b [folgen.]

118[Reading unseres inneren Sinnes for unserer inneren Sinne ('of our inner senses').]
precisely why its character always remains problematic). The other is the side where we take account of the form of the intuition of this object. This form must be sought not in the object in itself, but in the subject to whom the object appears. Yet this form belongs to the appearance of this object actually and necessarily.

Time and space are, accordingly, two sources of cognition. From these sources we can draw a priori different synthetic cognitions—as is shown above all by the splendid example that pure mathematics provides in regard to our cognitions of space and its relations. For time and space, taken together, are pure forms of all sensible intuition, and thereby make synthetic propositions possible a priori. But precisely thereby (i.e., by being merely conditions of sensibility), these a priori sources of cognition determine their own bounds; viz., they determine that they apply to objects merely insofar as these are regarded as appearances, but do not exhibit things in themselves. Appearances are the sole realm where these a priori sources of cognition are valid; if we go outside that realm, there is no further objective use that can be made of them. This [limited] reality of space and time leaves the reliability of experiential cognition otherwise untouched; for we have equal certainty in that cognition, whether these forms necessarily attach to things in themselves or only to our intuition of these things. Those, on the other hand, who assert that space and time—whether they assume these as subsistent or as only inherent—are real absolutely must be at variance with the principles of experience itself. For suppose they decide to assume space and time as subsistent (thus taking what is usually the side of the mathematical investigators of nature): then they must assume two eternal and infinite self-subsistent nonentities (space and time), which exist (yet without there being anything actual) only in order to encompass everything actual. Or suppose they assume space and time as only inherent (thus taking the side to which some metaphysical natural

\[^{119}\text{For Kant's view that things in themselves are (thought of as) what appears, see B xxvii.}\]

\[^{120}\text{Or 'make synthetic a priori propositions possible.' See B 19 br. n. 234.}\]

\[^{121}\text{For Kant's discussion of these two alternatives, representing (respectively) the Newtonian and the Leibnizian views, cf. the beginning of the preceding subsection, A 32–33/B 49 See also the references given at A 22/B 37 br. n. 27.}\]

\[^{122}\text{subsistierend }\]

\[^{123}\text{für sich bestehende.}\]

\[^{124}\text{Undinge: 'nonthings,' literally, with absurdity implied. See A 292/B 348 incl. br. n. 149.}\]
scientists belong). Here space and time count\(^{125}\) for them as relations of appearances (occurring concurrently or sequentially)—relations abstracted from experience but, as thus separated, presented confusedly. If they take this second side, then they must dispute that the mathematical a priori doctrines are valid for actual things (e.g., things in space), or at least that they are apodeictically certain. For a posteriori there is no such certainty at all. According to this second opinion, the a priori concepts of space and time are only creatures of the imagination,\(^{126}\) and their source must actually be sought in experience: the relations\(^{127}\) are abstracted from experience; and the imagination has made from them something that, while containing what is universal in these relations, yet cannot occur without the restrictions that nature has connected with them. Those who assume space and time as [real absolutely and] subsistent do gain this much: they make the realm of appearances free\(^{128}\) for mathematical assertions. On the other hand, these very conditions\(^{129}\) create great confusion for them when the understanding wants to go beyond the realm of appearances. Those, on the other hand, who assume space and time as [real absolutely but as] only inherent gain on this latter point. I.e., they do not find the presentations of space and time getting in their way when they want to judge objects not as appearances but merely as they relate to the understanding. But they can neither indicate a basis for the possibility of mathematical a priori cognitions (since they lack a true and objectively valid a priori intuition\(^{130}\)), nor bring the propositions of experience into necessary agreement with those a priori mathematical assertions. Our theory of the true character of these two original forms of sensibility provides the remedy for both [sets of] difficulties.

Finally, transcendental aesthetic cannot contain more than these two elements, i.e., space and time. This is evident from the fact that all other concepts belonging to sensibility presuppose something empirical. This holds even for the concept of motion, which unites the two components.\(^{131}\) For [the concept of] motion presupposes the perception of something mov-

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\(^{125}\)[*gelten.*]

\(^{126}\)[*Einbildungskraft* here, *Einbildung* just below.]

\(^{127}\)[Of space and time.]

\(^{128}\)[Which on the opposing view just mentioned it was not.]

\(^{129}\)[The self-subsistent space and time as being eternal and infinite.]

\(^{130}\)[To which to appeal]

\(^{131}\)[Space and time.]
able. But in space, considered in itself, there is nothing movable; therefore the movable must be something that we find in space only through experience, and hence must be an empirical datum. Similarly, transcendental aesthetic cannot include among its a priori data the concept of change. For time itself does not change; rather, what changes is something that is in time. Therefore the concept of change requires the perception of some existent and of the succession of its determinations; hence it requires experience.

§ 8

GENERAL COMMENTS ON TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

I. In order to forestall any misinterpretation of our opinion regarding the basic character of sensible cognition as such, we must first explain as distinctly as possible what that opinion is.

What we have tried to say, then, is the following. All our intuition is nothing but the presentation of appearance. The things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being. Nor do their relations in themselves have the character that they appear to us as having. And if we annul ourselves as subject, or even annul only the subjective character of the senses generally, then this entire character of objects and all their relations in space and time—indeed, even space and time themselves—would vanish; being appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but can exist only in us. What may be the case regarding objects in themselves and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains to us entirely unknown. All we know is the way in which we perceive them. That way is peculiar to us and does not necessarily have to apply to all beings, even

132 [Namely, matter. See the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Ak IV, 469–72.]
133 [Dasein, which usually means 'existence.']
134 ['§ 8' added in B.]
136 [Number added in B.]
137 [More literally, 'are acquainted with' kennen. I am using 'know' in this context for the sake of consistency with my rendering (for which there is no manageable alternative here) of unbekannt as 'unknown' just above, and of bekannt as 'known' near the end of this paragraph. ]
though it applies necessarily to all human beings. Solely with that way of perceiving are we dealing here. Space and time are its pure forms; sensation as such as its matter. Only that way of perceiving can we cognize a priori, i.e., prior\(^{138}\) to all actual perception, and that is why it is called pure intuition. Sensation, on the other hand, is that component in our cognition on whose account it is called a posteriori cognition, i.e., empirical intuition. The forms [of intuition] attach to our sensibility with absolute necessity, no matter of what kind our sensations may be; the sensations can differ very much. Even if we could bring this institution of ours to the highest degree of distinctness, that would still not get us closer to the character of objects in themselves. For what we would cognize, and cognize completely, would still be only our way of intuiting, i.e., our sensibility; and we would always cognize it only under the conditions attaching to the subject originally: space and time. What objects may be in themselves would still never become known to us, not even through the most enlightened cognition of what alone is given to us, viz., their appearance.

Hence we must reject the view\(^{139}\) that our entire sensibility is nothing but our confused presentation of things, a presentation that contains solely what belongs to them in themselves, but contains it only by way of\(^{140}\) an accumulation of characteristics\(^{141}\) and partial presentations that we do not consciously discriminate. For this view falsifies the concept of sensibility and of appearance, thus rendering the entire doctrine of sensibility useless and empty. The distinction between an indistinct and a distinct presentation is merely logical and does not concern the content.\(^{142}\) No doubt the concept of rightness\(^{143}\) as employed by common sense\(^{144}\) contains just the same as can be extricated from it by the most subtle speculation, except that in its common\(^{145}\) and practical use one is not conscious of the diverse presentations contained in that thought. But that does not entitle us to say

\(^{138}\)[vor.]

\(^{139}\)[Held by Leibniz.]

\(^{140}\)[unter.]

\(^{141}\)[Or 'marks': Merkmalen. See A 19/B 33 br. n. 14.]

\(^{142}\)[Cf., for this discussion, the First Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Ak. XX, 226n. See also above. A xvii br. n. 26.]

\(^{143}\)[Recht.]

\(^{144}\)[Literally, ‘sound understanding’; gesunder Verstand.]

\(^{145}\)[gemein.]
that the common concept is sensible and contains a mere appearance. For
rightness cannot be an appearance at all; rather, its concept lies in the un­
derstanding, and we present by it a character of acts (their moral char­
acter) which belongs to them in themselves. On the other hand, when a
body is presented in intuition, this presentation contains nothing whatever
that could belong to an object in itself. It contains, rather, merely the ap­
pearance of something, and the way we are affected by that something. This
receptivity of our cognitive capacity is called sensibility; and even if we
were to see through that appearance and to its very bottom, yet this recep­
tivity remains as different as day and night from cognition of the object
in itself.

Hence the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff, by considering the dis­
tinction between what is sensible and what is intellectual as a merely logi­
cal one, has imposed an entirely wrong point of view on all investigations
about the nature and origin of our cognitions. For plainly the distinction is
transcendental, and does not concern merely the form of these cognitions,
i.e., their distinctness or indistinctness, but concerns their origin and con­
tent. Hence sensibility does not merely fail to provide us with a distinct
cognition of the character of things in themselves; it provides us with none
whatsoever. And once we remove our subjective character, then the pre­
sented object, along with the properties contributed to it by sensible intu­
ition, is not to be found anywhere at all; nor can it possibly be found, be­
because this subjective character is precisely what determines the form of that
object as appearance.

It is true that we commonly make this distinction about appearances:
we distinguish what attaches to their intuition essentially and holds for the
sense of every human being in general, from what belongs to that intuition
only contingently by being valid only for a special position of this or that
sense, or for the special organization of that sense, but not valid for the re­
lation of [the intuition to] sensibility in general. We then speak of the first
kind of cognition as presenting the object in itself, and of the second as
presenting only its appearance. This distinction, however, is only empiri-
cal. 150 If (as is commonly done) we fail to go beyond it and do not (as we ought to do) regard that empirical intuition in turn as mere appearance, in which nothing whatever belonging to some thing in itself is to be found, then our transcendental distinction is lost. We then believe after all that we cognize things in themselves, even though in the world of sense, 151 however deeply we explore its objects, we deal with nothing whatever but appearances. Thus it is true, e.g., that when during a rain accompanied by sunshine we see a rainbow, we will call it a mere appearance, while calling the rain the thing in itself. And this is indeed correct, provided that we here take the concept of a thing in itself as meaning only something physical. We then mean by it something that in general 152 experience, and in all its different positions in relation to the senses, is yet determined thus, and not otherwise, in intuition. But suppose that we take this empirical something as such, and that—without being concerned about its being the same 153 for the sense of every human being—we ask whether it presents also an object in itself (not whether it presents the rain drops, for these, as appearances, will already be empirical objects). In that case our question about the presentation’s relation to the object is transcendental, and the answer is: Not only are these drops mere appearances; rather, even their round shape, and indeed even the space in which they fall, are nothing in themselves. They are, rather, mere modifications, or foundations, of our sensible intuition. The transcendental object, however, remains unknown 154 to us.

Our second important concern in this transcendental aesthetic is that it should not merely gain some favor as a plausible hypothesis, but should be as certain and indubitable as can possibly 155 be demanded of a theory that is to serve as an organon. In order to make this certainty fully evident, let us select some case that can render the validity of this organon obvious 156 and can serve to clarify further what has been set forth in § 3.

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150[Cf. A 29/B 45, also B 69 incl. br. n. 175.]
151[Parentheses around ‘in the world of sense’ removed.]
152[allgemein.]
153[Einstimmung.]
154[unbekannt.]
155[jemals.]
156[Remainder of sentence added in B.]
Suppose, then, that space and time are in themselves objective, and are conditions of the possibility of things in themselves. We then find, in the first place, that we encounter a large number of synthetic a priori propositions about both space and time—above all about space, which we shall therefore investigate here as our prime example. The propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically a priori and with apodeictic certainty. And so I ask: From where do you obtain such propositions, and on what does the understanding rely in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary and universally valid truths? There is no other way [to arrive at truths] than through concepts or through intuition. But these concepts and intuitions are both given either a priori or a posteriori. The a posteriori ones, i.e., empirical concepts as well as the empirical intuition on which they are based, can yield only such synthetic propositions as are likewise merely empirical, i.e., propositions of experience. As such, these propositions can never contain necessity and absolute universality; yet these are what characterize all geometric propositions. The first and sole means of arriving at such cognitions is a priori, through mere concepts or through intuition. From mere concepts, however, we clearly can obtain no synthetic cognition at all, but only analytic cognition. Just take the proposition that two straight lines cannot enclose any space and hence do not permit [construction of] any figure, and try to derive it from the concept of straight lines and of the number two. Or take the proposition that three straight lines permit [construction of] a figure, and try similarly to derive it from these mere concepts. All your endeavor is futile, and you find yourselves compelled to have recourse to intuition, as indeed geometry always does. Hence you give yourselves an object in intuition. But of which kind is this intuition? Is it a pure a priori intuition or an empirical one? If it were an empirical intuition, then it could never turn into a universally valid proposition, let alone an apodeictic one; for experience can never supply anything like that. Hence you must give your object to yourselves a priori in intuition, and base your synthetic proposition on this object. Now suppose that there did not lie within you a power to intuit a priori; that this subjective condition were not, as regards its form, at the same time the universal a priori condition under which alone the object of this (outer) intuition is itself possible; and that the object (the triangle) were something in itself, even apart from any relation to yourselves as subject. If that were so, how could you say that

157[Cf. the Prolegomena, Ak. IV, 268–74.]
158[Vermögen.]
what necessarily lies in [or belongs to] your subjective conditions for constructing a triangle must also belong necessarily to the triangle itself? For, after all, you could not add to your concepts (of three lines) anything new (the figure) that would therefore have to be met with necessarily in the object, since this object would be given prior to your cognition rather than through it. Hence you could not synthetically a priori establish anything whatsoever about external objects if space (and similarly time) were not a mere form of your intuition, an intuition that a priori contains conditions under which alone things can be external objects for you—these objects being nothing in themselves, apart from these subjective conditions. Therefore the following is not merely possible—or probable, for that matter—but indubitably certain: Space and time, as the necessary conditions of all (outer and inner) experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuition. Hence in relation to these conditions all objects are mere appearances, and are not given to us in this way on their own. And that is why much can be said a priori about these objects as regards their form, but not the least can ever be said about the thing in itself that may underlie these appearances.

II. This theory, according to which both outer and inner sense are ideal and hence all objects of the senses are mere appearances, can be confirmed superbly by the following observation. Whatever in our cognition belongs to intuition (excluding, therefore, what are not cognitions at all, i.e., both the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the will) contains nothing but mere relations: of places in an intuition (extension), of change of places (motion), and of laws according to which this change is determined (motive forces). But what is present in that place, or what effect—besides the change of place—it produces in the things themselves, is not given to us by [what belongs to intuition]. Now through mere relations we do not, of course, cognize a thing in itself. Hence our judgment must surely be this: since through outer sense we are given nothing but mere relational presentations, outer sense can, by the same token, contain in its presentation only the relation of an object to the subject, but not the intrinsic character belonging to the object in itself. The same applies to inner intuition.

159[*an sich selbst.*]

160[Or 'which contains a priori conditions. ']

161[Or, possibly, 'to our intuition. ']

162[Remainder of the Transcendental Aesthetic added in B ]

163[Kant uses *Ding* (in the plural) here, *Sache* just below.]
For not only does the proper material in it, with which we occupy our mind, consist in presentations of *outer senses*; but the time in which we place these presentations, and which itself precedes the consciousness of them in experience and underlies, as formal condition, the way in which we place them within the mind, already contains relations: of succession, of simultaneity, and of what is simultaneous with succession (the permanent). Now, presentation that can precede all acts of thinking anything is intuition; and if this intuition contains nothing but relations then it is the form of intuition. But this form does not present anything except insofar as something is being placed within the mind. Therefore this form can be nothing but the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity—viz., this placing of its presentation—and hence affected by itself; i.e., it is an inner sense insofar as that sense’s form is concerned. Whatever is presented through a sense is, to that extent, always appearance. Hence either we must not grant that there is an inner sense at all; or we must grant that the subject who is the object of this sense can be presented through it only as appearance, and not as he would judge himself if his intuition were self-activity only, i.e., if it were intellectual intuition. What underlies this whole difficulty is this: how can a subject inwardly intuit himself? But this difficulty is shared by every theory. The consciousness of oneself (apperception) is the simple presentation of the *I*, and if through this consciousness by itself all the manifold in the subject were given *self-actively*, then the inner intuition would be intellectual. But in man this consciousness requires also inner perception of the manifold given in the subject beforehand; and the way in which this manifold is given in the mind—viz., without spontaneity—must, for the sake of marking this distinction, be called sensibility. If the power to become conscious of oneself is to locate ( apprehend) what lies in the mind, then it must affect the mind; and only in that way can it produce an intuition of itself. But the form of this intuition lies at the basis beforehand in the mind; and this form determines, in the presentation of time, the way in which the manifold is [placed] together in the

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164[setzen.]

165[Selbsttätigkeit, also translatable as ‘spontaneity’ (which I prefer to use for Spontaneität—cf. just below).]

166[See B 72.]

167[Emphasis added, to improve the readability of this single-letter word (as used in this way). This improvement is usually more obvious than it is here.]

168[Or ‘ability’: Vermögen]
mind. And thus this power does not intuit itself as it would if it presented itself directly and self-actively; rather, it intuits itself according to the way in which it is affected from within, and hence intuits itself as it appears to itself, not as it is.\footnote{169}

III. I am saying, then, that the intuition of external objects and the self-intuition of the mind both present these objects and the mind, in space and in time, as they affect our senses, i.e., as they appear. But I do not mean by this that these objects\footnote{170} are a mere \textit{illusion}.\footnote{171} For when we deal with appearance, the objects, and indeed even the properties\footnote{172} that we ascribe to them, are always regarded as something actually given—except that insofar as the object’s character\footnote{173} depends only on the subject’s way of intuiting this given object in its relation to him, we do also distinguish this object as \textit{appearance}\footnote{174} from the same object as object \textit{in itself}.\footnote{175} Thus when I posit\footnote{176} both bodies and my soul as being in accordance with the quality of space and time, as condition of their existence, I do indeed assert that this quality lies in my way of intuiting and not in those objects in themselves. But in asserting this I am not saying that the bodies merely appear\footnote{177} to be outside me, or that my soul only seems to be given in my self-consciousness. It would be my own fault if I turned into mere illusion what I ought to class with appearance.\footnote{178} This is not, however, what hap-

\footnote{169}[These topics will be fully explored in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, A 341–405/B 399–432. See also B 152–59.]
\footnote{170}[\textit{Gegenstände} here, \textit{Objekte} just above and just below.]
\footnote{171}[\textit{Schein}.]
\footnote{172}[\textit{Beschaffenheiten}.]
\footnote{173}[\textit{Beschaffenheit}.]
\footnote{174}[\textit{Erscheinung}.]
\footnote{175}[In Kant’s usual (transcendental) sense of this expression, rather than in its empirical sense (found, e.g., at A 29/B 45 and A 45/B 62.).]
\footnote{176}[\textit{setzen}.]
\footnote{177}[\textit{scheinen}.]
\footnote{178}[The predicates of the appearance can be ascribed to the object itself\footnote{18} in relation to our sense: e.g., to the rose, the red color or the scent. But what is mere illusion can never be ascribed as predicate to an object, precisely because illusion ascribes to the object taken \textit{by itself}\footnote{18} what belongs to it only in relation to the senses or in general to the subject—an example being the two handles initially ascribed to Saturn. If something is not to be met with at all in the object in itself, but is always to be met with in the object’s relation to the subject and is inseparable from the pre-]
pens if we follow our principle that all our sensible intuitions are ideal. On the contrary: it is when we attribute *objective reality* to those forms of presentation that we cannot prevent everything from being thereby transformed into mere *illusion*. For suppose that we regard space and time as properties that, as far as their very possibility is concerned, must be found in things in themselves. And now reflect on the absurdities in which we then become entangled, inasmuch as we then have two infinite things that must not be substances nor anything actually inhering in substances, but that yet must be something existent—indeed, must be the necessary condition for the existence of all things—and must moreover remain even if all existing things are annulled. If we thus reflect on this supposition, then we can hardly blame the good Berkeley for downgrading bodies to mere illusion. Indeed, even our own existence, which would in this way be made dependent on the self-subsistent reality of a nonentity such as time would be, would be transformed along with this time into nothing but illusion—an absurdity of which no one thus far has made himself guilty.

IV. In natural theology we think an object [viz., God] that not only cannot possibly be an object of intuition for us, but that cannot in any way be an object of sensible intuition even to itself. [When we think of God in this way,] we take great care to remove the conditions of time and space from all his intuition. (All his cognition must be intuition rather than *thought*, which always manifests limits.) But what right do we have to do this if we have beforehand turned space and time into forms of things in themselves—such forms, moreover, as are a priori conditions of the existence of things and hence would remain even if we had annulled the things

sentation of the object, then it is appearance. And thus the predicates of space and time are rightly ascribed to objects of the senses, as such; and in this there is no illusion. Illusion first arises if, by contrast, I ascribe the redness to the rose in itself, or the handles to Saturn, or extension to all external objects in themselves, without taking account of—and limiting my judgment to—a determinate relation of these objects to the subject.

*a*[selbst.]

*b*[für sich.]

*c* [Keeping the original *ersteren*, which Erdmann changes to *letzteren*, so that we would have to read 'presentation of the subject."

*d* [an sich. The expression is actually used adverbially here (and probably also just above), as modifying 'ascribe.' Although 'in themselves' (etc) does not lend itself to adverbial use, switching to a different term here (e.g., 'intrinsically') would impair clarity.]

**179**[Sachen here, Dinge just below.]

**180**[machen.]
themselves? For as conditions of all existence in general, they would have to be conditions also of the existence of God. If we are not to make space and time objective forms of all things, then we are left with only one alternative: we must make them subjective forms of our kind of intuition, inner and outer. Our kind of intuition is called sensible because it is not original. I.e., it is not such that through this intuition itself the existence of its object is given (the latter being a kind of intuition that, as far as we can see, can belong only to the original being). Rather, our kind of intuition is dependent on the existence of the object, and hence is possible only by the object’s affecting the subject’s capacity to present.

There is, moreover, no need for us to limit this kind of intuition—intuition in space and time—to the sensibility of man. It may be (though we cannot decide this) that any finite thinking being must necessarily agree with man in this regard. Yet even if this kind of intuition were thus universally valid, it would not therefore cease to be sensibility. It would remain sensibility precisely because it is derivative (intuitus derivativus) rather than original (intuitus originarius), and hence is not intellectual intuition. For the reason just set forth, intellectual intuition seems to belong solely to the original being, and never to a being that is dependent as regards both its existence and its intuition (an intuition that determines that being’s existence by reference to given objects). This last remark, however, must be considered as included in our aesthetic theory only as an illustration, not as a basis of proof.

181[machen.]

182[Rather than intellectual.]

183[ursprünglich. On intellectual (original) intuition (and the intuitive understanding that would have it), see B 138–39, 145, A 166/B 207 incl. br. n. 67, A 249–52, B 307–9, A 256/B 311–12, and A 279–80 = B 335–36, and cf. B xi incl. br. n. 144g, B 68, 135, 149. See also the Critique of Judgment, Ak. 402–8, and cf. 418. For the way in which the concept of an intellectual intuition (and of an intuitive understanding) unites Kant’s three Critiques in one system, see the Translator’s Introduction to my translation of that work (above, B xvii br. n. 73), lxxxvi–cii.]

184[Ur-..]

185[Cf. B 275–79.]
CONCLUDING THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

Thus in our pure a priori intuitions, space and time, we now have one of the components required for solving the general problem of transcendental philosophy: *How are synthetic propositions possible a priori?*\(^{186}\) When in an a priori judgment about space and time we want to go beyond the given concept, we encounter\(^{187}\) what cannot be discovered a priori in the given concept, but can indeed be so discovered in the intuition corresponding to that concept and can be combined with it synthetically. Because of this,\(^{188}\) however, such judgments can never reach beyond objects\(^{189}\) of the senses, and can hold only for objects of possible experience.

\(^{186}\text{[Cf. B 19 incl. br. ns. 234 and 235.]}

\(^{187}\text{[In the a priori intuition.]}

\(^{188}\text{[The judgment's dependence on intuition and the merely synthetic connection to the concept.]}\)

\(^{189}\text{[Gegenstände here, Objekte just below.]}\)